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Assortative matching with network spillovers.1
Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen2
University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Abstract
This paper investigates endogenous network formation by heterogeneous agents. The
agents’ types determine the value of linking and we incorporate spillovers as utility
from indirect connections. We provide sufficient conditions for a class of networks
with sorting to be stable for low to moderate spillovers; with only two types these
networks are the unique pairwise stable ones. We also show that this sorting is
suboptimal for moderate to high spillovers despite otherwise obeying the conditions
for sorting in Becker (1973). This shows that in our sorted networks a tension between
stability and efficiency is present. We analyze a policy tool to mitigate suboptimal
sorting.
Keywords: network formation, under-connectivity, assortative matching, network
externalities, one-sided matching.
JEL classification: C71; C78; D61; D62; D85.
1. Introduction1
Social relations and their network structures are fundamental in almost all as-2
pects of our lives: which jobs we get, how we perceive the world, the decisions we3
make, etc. (Jackson, 2019). A ubiquitous finding in studies of social relations is the4
tendency to form more ties with people similar to one-self, i.e. the pattern known5
1This paper has grown out of Bjerre-Nielsen (2015). The author is grateful to Peter Norman
Sørensen who supervised his PhD. A big thanks to Jan Eeckhout, Matthew Jackson, John Kennes,
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as sorting or homophily, see the meta-study McPherson et al. (2001). Pioneered by6
Becker (1973), economic research has contributed to the understanding of sorting7
by providing mathematically sufficient conditions for sorting in marriage- and labor8
markets to be stable and optimal. The essential condition for sorting is supermodu-9
larity. This condition entails complementarity in type is such that similar types gain10
higher value from linking than dissimilar ones. Previous research has not analyzed11
what implications supermodularity has for assortative matching in the context of12
networks, either with or without utility from indirect connections.13
We extend assortative matching to the context of networks. We demonstrate14
fundamental properties for a class of networks which we label as having sorted con-15
nectivity. We require these networks to satisfy the following conditions: perfect16
sorting such that all agents link only with agents of the same type; type-connectivity17
whereby any two agents of the same type are connected; and, no-link surplus whereby18
all available links are used. Intuitively, these networks maximize utility both at the19
individual and aggregate levels, conditional on perfect sorting. We show that net-20
works with sorted connectivity exist when the number of agents for each type exceeds21
the number of links allowed per agent and a regularity condition holds, see Proposi-22
tion 3.23
We provide a novel, parsimonious framework which unites the frameworks of com-24
plementarity between heterogeneous agents (Becker, 1973) and utility from indirect25
connections to friends of friends (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). In our setup every26
agent has, at most, a fixed number of links, which reflects limited amounts of time27
and effort.3 We investigate stability of networks in the following sense: no two agents28
can form and/or delete links in the network to improve their joint payoff (we allow29
for transfers of utility). Our central result is that if Becker’s condition for supermod-30
ularity holds and spillovers (i.e magnitude of utility from indirect connections) are31
low to moderate, then networks with sorted connectivity are stable; with only two32
types of agents it further holds that every stable network has sorted connectivity.33
See details in Theorem 1.34
We also investigate the efficiency for networks with sorted connectivity. For35
moderate to high spillovers and supermodularity we show that networks with sorted36
connectivity are inefficient. Therefore, we may refer to inefficient sorted networks37
as ‘under-connected’ as they have too little connectivity across types relative to the38
efficient networks. In the situation where there are only two types of agents, and39
3A limited number of partners is consistent with empirical research: Ugander et al. (2011) show
that the average number of social ties for the entire Facebook network is a few hundred, and likewise
Miritello et al. (2013) show the number of phone calls for millions of people is also limited.
2
supermodularity holds, we strengthen the results: for low spillovers, networks with40
sorted connectivity are efficient – otherwise, networks with connectivity across types41
are efficient. Note that among these results, the latter is about global efficiency42
whereas the former is about comparative (relative) efficiency, see Theorem 2 for43
details.44
The complementarity captured by supermodularity resembles situations where45
more similarity in matches increases the joint utility. In these situations heterogeneity46
in type may refer to productive and non-productive capabilities as well as other47
characteristics with synergy between types. Natural examples include geography or48
language, as suggested by Church and King (1993). Matching contrary to these49
characteristics may lead to increased transaction costs or miscommunication and,50
therefore, to lower aggregate productivity. Another example is combined effects in51
skills – it could be that matching workers or students with similar skills results52
in higher joint utility, e.g. as in the classic O-ring model of Kremer (1993). A53
property of this complementarity is exogeneity; synergy depends only on agents’54
pre-defined types, not other parts of the matching/network. We note there are55
other kinds of homophily/sorting on exogenous characteristics, e.g. eye-color, height.56
However, these kinds of homophily are often based directly on mutual preference for57
similarity and do not require conditions on the joint utility. This difference often58
discussed as transferable versus non-transferable utility, where this paper uses the59
former framework.60
Our results show that Becker’s supermodularity condition is no longer sufficient61
for sorting to be either stable or efficient. This comes from the fact that agents face62
a trade-off between two sources of utility: on the one hand, complementarity implies63
that increased sorting leads to higher direct utility as links between similar agents are64
more valuable; on the other hand, positive spillovers entail that more sorting can lead65
to a loss of utility from indirect connections. Therefore, instability and inefficiency of66
sorting stems from the utility of indirect connections dominating complementarity,67
which imply that the stable networks are under-connected. However, when com-68
bined, our results show that if there are moderate spillovers and supermodularity,69
then networks with sorted connectivity are stable but inefficient. The reason is that70
the underlying thresholds governing the two properties are not identical. The intu-71
ition behind this incompatibility of stability and efficiency is that two agents forming72
and removing links will internalize the direct utility from sorting, but they do not73
internalize the utility from indirect connections for third party agents. We show by74
visual inspection that the scope for incompatibility (i.e. the region of ‘moderate’75
spillovers) widens as the number of agents grows and strength of complementarity76
increases. We demonstrate in Proposition 4 how to enact policies that curb exces-77
3
sive sorting by leveraging contracts that make payoffs conditional on links. These78
new insights can help policymakers within organizations to design better internal79
networks by overcoming under-connectivity, e.g. between individuals within schools,80
corporations or organizations.81
The policy implications are easy to see in a stylized example. Suppose there are82
two islands with costly transportation from one to the other. If spillovers are moder-83
ate in the sense of our model, then the network is under-connected – no inhabitants84
of either island want to establish connections with inhabitants of the other island as85
their individual payoff is too small. Nevertheless, by paying agents to connect, every-86
one could be better off. That is, policies that foster connectivity across the islands87
can increase the efficiency of the underlying network. With more islands that are all88
disconnected, the problem can compound and thus the scope for policies increases.89
Although unrealistic, the results should translate to situations with high levels of ho-90
mophily combined with strong complementarity and/or many agents. For instance,91
new empirical work has already shown that a few connections between otherwise92
connected sub-communities in online social media can foster diffusion of information93
that otherwise would be unlikely (Park et al., 2018). Our model also helps us to94
understand the potential consequences of forming organizations that consist of dis-95
joint parts, e.g. school classes, company divisions. If the organizational parts are not96
encouraged to interact across affiliated parts, it may lead to no interaction (which is97
suboptimal), as the disjoint structure provides an implicit complementarity among98
members from the same part of the organization.99
This paper also makes a number of additional contributions towards the under-100
standing of assortative matching. We establish that supermodularity is sufficient for101
stable networks to contain a general pattern of sorting by type without utility from102
indirect connections, see Proposition 1. We also show that if the agent population103
is very large, then sorting is the unique strongly stable outcome (i.e. the core),104
when Becker’s complementarity condition holds and spillovers are not too high, see105
Proposition 5.4106
Literature. In what follows we review relevant literature and discuss our results in107
the context of the most related work. A seminal mathematical work on sorting and108
segregation is Schelling (1969, 1971). Although related, the modeling differences109
between Schelling’s spatial model and networks (or matchings) are stark; networks110
are more flexible and allow for connections between any individuals and utility from111
indirect connections. Two-sided matching captures agents from two distinct sides112
4The level of spillovers satisfies asymptotic independence in social connections.
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who match, e.g. in labor and dating markets. The inaugural study on sorting is113
Becker (1973), which has since been extended to a search setting with match frictions,114
see Shimer and Smith (2000) and a recent review in Chade et al. (2017). Most of115
the earlier work on sorting investigates two-sided matching but we use a one-sided116
matching model. The research on one-sided assortative matching has been limited to117
formation of partnerships and clubs, which correspond respectively to one-to-one and118
many-to-many matchings (Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988; Kremer, 1993; Durlauf and119
Seshadri, 2003; Legros and Newman, 2002; Pycia, 2012; Baccara and Yariv, 2013;120
Xing, 2016).5 All the research on one-sided assortative matching finds conditions121
for sorting which correspond to type complementarity in Becker (1973). Yet, none122
of the above papers allows for general linking beyond partnerships and clubs, or123
considers network spillovers. We relax both of these assumptions. We have carefully124
chosen our framework to use the fundamental concepts from the earlier literature, i.e.125
supermodularity, a finite capacity for forming links, and pairwise link formation. Our126
main contribution to the literature on assortative matching is to show which extra127
conditions in combination with supermodularity lead to stability and efficiency in128
networks with utility from indirect connections. Another key contribution is that we129
show potential incompatibility between stability and efficiency and that policies that130
create incentives to link can fix the issue. We also extend the framework of assortative131
matching without externalities to a one-sided setting with many partners but without132
restrictions on link structure (i.e. limited to clubs): Proposition 1 establishes that133
sorting is stable using a novel measure of sorting which is tractable in equilibrium.134
The only paper that investigates sorting in networks with externalities is de Mart´ı135
and Zenou (2017); they also model type complementarity and positive spillovers.6136
Their results show the existence of sorted networks that are stable yet inefficient137
due to the lack of linking across types.7 Although this model is similar to ours,138
there are crucial differences that motivate our analysis. The essential difference139
is that we use exogenous complementarity which is independent of the network,140
while de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) use endogenous complementarity. de Mart´ı and141
Zenou (2017) specifically assume that complementarity is strongest when the level of142
sorting is high, while there is no complementarity when there is negative sorting (i.e.143
5Buchanan (1965) defines clubs as groups where one’s utility depends on all other members. This
means that clubs are networks with the implicit assumption that any agents of the same group are
all linked. In the networks literature, such groups are known as cliques.
6Note that this paper was developed independently and without awareness of de Mart´ı and
Zenou (2017).
7See Propositions 1.ii, 4.iii in de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) for results on stable sorting; their
Proposition 6 contains results on inefficiency.
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tendency to link with dissimilar types). This different assumption makes our results144
considerably stronger than de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) when there are two types: we145
establish that sorting constitutes the unique set of stable networks; we show there146
exists a globally efficient network that is sorted but has connectivity between groups147
and we demonstrate that this network is implementable through a simple policy, see148
Proposition 4. In addition, our results also apply more generally as they are neither149
limited to only five agents of each type, nor to sub-structures of within-type networks150
being either stars or cliques, nor to only two types.151
The essential difference between how we model complementarity here and how152
de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) model it also implies that we interpret our results dif-153
ferently. First, our results are relevant in cases when we do not expect endogenous154
complementarity (see example above). Second, the modeling of complementarity155
also entails that the source of inefficiency is different. In our setup suboptimality156
stems from misaligned incentives which entail there is a general incompatibility of157
efficiency and stability of as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Thus, as sorting is the158
unique stable outcome, no one wants to volunteer to build the bridge between com-159
munities which increases overall welfare unless there is an outside readjustment of160
the incentives, e.g. by policy as we explore or by allowing different contracts (Bloch161
and Jackson, 2007). On the contrary, in de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) the network162
with two connected communities, is both efficient and stable. Thus, suboptimality163
is not due to incompatibility of efficiency and stability, but rather that agents ended164
up in one of the pairwise stable networks characterized by low welfare.8165
There is a vast literature on optimal networks under externalities. The field166
has a long tradition and begins with the general formulation under the quadratic167
assignment problem (Koopmans and Beckmann, 1957). The field of matching and168
networks under externalities was revolutionized by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)169
who demonstrate that there is an incompatibility in networks between stability and170
efficiency; Bloch and Jackson (2007) extend these results to show that the tension is171
preserved when allowing for more coordination and more flexible transfers between172
agents. Although Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) as well as Bloch and Jackson (2007)173
show that the incompatibility between stability and efficiency holds generally, they174
provide very little in terms of what structure inefficient networks can have. Our175
8The results in de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) do not rule out that there can exist stable networks
(e.g. some amount of connectivity between groups) that are more efficient than a sorted network.
This follows as de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) have multiplicity in equilibria and they only estab-
lish relative inefficiency between two networks (complete network and perfectly sorted network of
cliques).
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contribution is to provide explicit structure to the incompatibility in the context of176
sorting. This extension may seem small but it has important implications - sorting is177
a fundamental pattern in empirical networks (McPherson et al., 2001) and therefore178
we show that the incompatibility may hold widely.179
The most relevant research on exogenous complementarity in networks is John-180
son and Gilles (2000); Jackson and Rogers (2005); Galeotti et al. (2006); the first181
assumes agents all have a unique type with linking costs proportional to their dis-182
tance, while the two latter use an islands type of model (where agents have same183
type). Johnson and Gilles (2000) shows existence of a pairwise stable equilibrium184
with local connectivity between adjacent types, possibly with local cliques where all185
agents within a given range are connected. Jackson and Rogers (2005) shows that186
clustering and short paths are robust features among both pairwise stable networks187
and efficient networks with full linkage among same type. Galeotti et al. (2006)188
investigate minimally connected networks in a setup with one-sided link formation.9189
There are other strands of literature on homophily in network formation e.g.190
Currarini et al. (2009, 2010) and Bramoulle´ et al. (2012). Their approach, however,191
is different: we use a one period model with strategic link formation, while they rely192
on matching sequences that are dynamic and stochastic. Currarini et al. (2009, 2010)193
investigate how differences in community sizes play a role in explaining empirical194
phenomena, including homophily. Bramoulle´ et al. (2012) investigate the conditions195
for long run integration of a network. Other literature has investigated the role of196
homophily in a model combining referral networks and a labor market (Montgomery,197
1991; Galenianos, 2018).198
Paper organization. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model;199
Section 3 investigates sorting under no externalities; Section 4 analyzes the setting200
with externalities, focusing on sorting and its potential suboptimality, and; Section201
5 concludes with a discussion of assumptions. All proofs are found in Appendix202
Appendix A.203
2. Model204
Let N = {1, .., n} constitute a set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with a205
fixed measure of type, xi ∈ X, where X ⊂ R is the set of (realized) types for agents206
in N . Let x¯ = maxX and
¯
x = minX. Define the vector of types X = (x1, x2, ..., xn).207
9Note that one-sided link formation is based on the setup of Bala and Goyal (2000) which only
requires the weaker equilibrium concept, Nash stability, as links do not need mutual acceptance.
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Let the agents’ type be sorted in descending order according to their label such that208
xl ≥ xl+1 for l = 1, .., n− 1.209
Linking and networks. Two agents i, j ∈ N may link if they both accept it. Any of210
the two agents who link may break the link without mutual consent. A link between i211
and j is denoted ij ∈ µ, where the set µ consists of links and is called a network. The212
set of all networks is denoted M = {µ|µ ⊆ µc}, where µc is the complete network in213
which all agents are linked.214
A coalition of agents, t, is a subset of agents (i.e. t ⊆ N) such that t ∈ T , where215
T is the power set of N excluding the empty set. For a given group, t, define X (t)216
as the vector of types in descending order over each of the agents in t. A coalitional217
move is a set of actions implemented by a coalition that moves the network from one218
state to another. A move from µ to µ˜ is feasible for coalition t if added links, µ˜\µ,219
are only formed between members of coalition t and deleted links, µ\µ˜, only contain220
members of coalition t.221
Network measures. The neighborhood, ν, is the set of agents who an agent links to:222
νi(µ) = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ µ}. The number of neighbors is called degree and denoted223
ki(·) for i. A path is a subset of links {i1i2, i2i3, ..., il−1il} ⊆ µ where no agent is224
reached more than once; the length of a path is the number of links in its set. The225
distance between two agents, i, j, in a network is the length of the shortest path226
between them - this is denoted pij : M → N0; when no path exists then the distance227
is infinite.228
Utility. The utility accruing to agent i is denoted ui. An agent’s utility equals229
benefits less costs, expressed mathematically as ui = bi − ci. The aggregate utility230
is denoted U(·). We model costs of linking indirectly through an opportunity cost231
of linking. We do this through a (degree) quota on links, κ, which is the maximum232
number of links for any agent, i.e. for i ∈ N , it holds ki(·) ≤ κ. We say there233
is no linking surplus when all agents have a degree equal to the degree quota, i.e.234
∀i ∈ N : ki = κ. The benefit to agent i is a weighted sum consisting of two elements;235
network and individual value:236
bi(µ) = Σj 6=iwij(µ) · zij. (1)
The network factor wij(µ) is a function of network distance. The individual link237
value is zij, which measures the personal value to i of linking to j - the value is a238
function of the two partners’ types zij = z(xi, xj). The function z is assumed twice239
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differentiable as well as taking positive and bounded values.10 Let the total link value240
be defined as the value of linking for the pair, i.e. Zij = zij + zji.241
In order to derive results, a restriction of payoffs is necessary. The essential242
feature of the total link value for sorting is complementarity in type:11243
Definition 1. The link value has supermodularity if ∂
2
∂x∂y
Z(x, y) > 0. This entails:244
Z(x, x˜) + Z(y, y˜) > Z(x, y) + Z(x˜, y˜), x > y˜, x˜ > y. (2)
The network components are further restricted in the analysis under externalities245
in Section 4.246
The game framework. This paper explores a static setting of one period. Agents’247
information about the payoffs of other agents is complete. Together the players,248
action, utility and information constitute a game.249
We assume that any pair of agents can transfer ‘utility’ between them. Let a250
net-transfer from agent j to agent i be denoted as τij ∈ R such that τij = −τji,251
which implies non-wastefulness of utility. The matrix of net transfers is denoted τ .252
Transfers can be exchanged by any pair of agents. We specifically assume that for253
any pair of agents there is mutual dependence between transfers and their link, if254
they have one. This entails that a transfer cannot be changed unless both agents255
agree, otherwise the non-consenting agent can break the link. Conversely, if the link256
is broken without mutual consent, then the transfers are set to zero. Although this257
seems similar to Bloch and Jackson (2007), the conditionality here is only between258
agents who are linked.259
Stability. We define network stability using coalition moves. A coalition t is blocking260
a network µ with net-transfers τ if there is a feasible coalition move from network µ261
to network µ˜ with τ˜ where all members in t have a higher net-payoff after the move.262
We employ two concepts of stability. The first is strong stability : this is satisfied263
for a network if there exist transfers such that no coalition (of any size) may have264
a feasible move that is profitable for all its members. The second concept, pairwise265
(Nash) stability,12 is similar but has weaker requirements: it holds when there exist266
transfers where it holds that no coalitions of at most two agents may block. A further267
discussion of the stability concepts is found in Section 5.268
10The upper bound rules out an infinite number of links in equilibrium.
11Complementarity between type corresponds to cheaper links between same/similar types used
in the models of Johnson and Gilles (2000); Jackson and Rogers (2005); Galeotti et al. (2006).
12This is also known as bilateral stability, cf. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
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Our pairwise definition of stability is stricter than that of Jackson and Wolinsky269
(1996). However, the stricter requirement enables substitution of links (simultaneous270
deletion and formation), which is a necessary requirement for establishing results in271
the matching literature.272
A noteworthy feature is that strong stability implies pairwise stability; thus any273
condition valid for all pairwise stable networks also applies to any strongly stable274
network. In addition, without utility from indirect connections (i.e. no spillovers),275
every pairwise stable network is also strongly stable, see Lemma 1. Note also that276
any strongly stable network requires efficiency (coalition of all agents can implement277
any network). We use the efficiency property of strongly stable networks to derive278
the structure of these networks in Proposition 5.279
3. Analysis: no spillovers280
This brief section analyzes the setting without utility from indirect connections.281
We begin with defining our measure of sorting. The concept of sorting that we282
employ is a generalization of the sorting when there is a single partner, such as in283
Becker’s marriage market. The shape of sorting is such that a high type agent has284
partners which weakly dominate in type when compared partner-by-partner with the285
partners of a lower type agent. Note the comparison is done over the sorted set of286
partners type X . The sorting pattern is mathematically defined as:287
Definition 2. Sorting in type holds in µ if for all pairs i, j such that xi > xj it288
holds that:289
X (νi(µ)/{j})l ≥ X (νj(µ)/{i})l+l∗ , ∀l ∈ {1, .., k∗},
where k∗ = min(ki(µ), kj(µ)) and l∗ = max(kj(µ)− ki(µ), 0).290
Our first result is that sorting in type emerges under the same conditions as in291
Becker (1973) when network externalities are absent:292
Proposition 1. If there is supermodularity and no externalities, then for any pair-293
wise stable network there is sorting in type.294
The proof of this proposition follows by establishing that a pairwise stable net-295
work must be strongly stable without externalities; then we use that strongly stable296
networks are efficient and show that sorting in type must hold under efficiency.13297
13Note that the current proof relies on comparing partner order of l for i with order l + l∗ for j
in Definition 2. We conjecture that this can be relaxed to comparison partner of order l of i with
order l + l∗ of j.
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4. Analysis: positive spillovers298
We proceed to a more general context where indirect connections matter for299
utility. Whenever we allow for externalities we restrict our attention to two forms of300
linking utility.301
wij(µ) =
{
δpij(µ)−1, constant decay,
1=1(pij(µ)) + δ · 1∈[2,∞)(pij(µ)), hyperbolic decay,
(3)
where 1∈(1,∞)(l) is the Dirac measure/indicator function of whether 1 < l <∞.302
The first and more general setting is where utility from connections decays over303
increasing distance at a constant exponential rate. This corresponds to benefits from304
linking in the ‘connections-model’ from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The other case305
is when externalities from indirect connections are discounted equally at any distance306
if there is a connection, i.e. a finite path length. This second case is referred to as307
hyperbolic decay and entails that there is no decay beyond that from distance one308
(linked) to distance two.309
The introduction of externalities to our framework implies that the pairwise util-310
ity no longer depends only on the total link benefits. As a consequence, sorting is not311
guaranteed to be either stable or efficient. The intuition for this is straight forward:312
externalities entail that the total welfare from sorting is internalized for the pair,313
while the total welfare for indirect connections are not internalized. We see this by314
inspecting the utility functions. Suppose that gˆ is a pairwise deviation such that315
agents i, j form a link. Then the pairwise total net utility from deviation can be316
expressed as follows under externalities:317
ui(gˆ) + uj(gˆ)− ui(g)− uj(g) = Zij +
∑
k∈{i,j}, l /∈N\{i,j}
zkl ·
(
δpkl(gˆ) − δpkl(g)) (4)
From the analysis in the previous section we found that, in the absence of ex-318
ternalities, sorting prevails. In the above equation this incentive to sort is captured319
by the component Zij. Therefore, we see that the total benefits from sorting are320
preserved for the pair.321
The total benefits to all agents that accrue from agents i, j forming a link are:
U(µˆ)− U(µ) =ui(µˆ) + uj(µˆ)− ui(µ)− uj(µ) +
∑
l /∈N\{i,j}
[ul(µˆ)− ul(µ)]
=ui(µˆ) + uj(µˆ)− ui(µ)− uj(µ) +
∑
l /∈N\{i,j}, l′∈N, l′ 6=l
Zll′ · (wll′(µˆ)− wll′(µ))
(5)
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Inspection of Equation 5 informs us that the pairwise utility of linking does not322
capture the aggregate gains from linking. Moreover, we see that the gains not cap-323
tured correspond to the indirect benefits that others receive from the deviation. This324
implies that there is a disparity between the pairwise incentives and total welfare:325
the pairwise incentives capture the full benefits of sorting but not the full gains from326
lower distances between agents.327
4.1. Finite population328
We begin with the situation where there are a finite number of agents. Before329
starting the analysis of networks under externalities we define some useful concepts.330
Naturally, we call networks perfectly sorted when the agent of each type only link331
among themselves. A further important distinction is whether the subnetworks for332
each type are connected among agents of the same type. Such connectivity is suffi-333
cient for agents to reap all the gains of utility from indirect connections when sorting334
occurs if there is hyperbolic decay in spillovers. Finally, we want to ensure that there335
is no surplus of links as this would imply wastefulness, which is not in the interest336
of agents as they always benefit from linking. Combining these concepts we can337
introduce our main concept, sorted connectivity of networks:338
Definition 3. A network has perfect sorting if every linked pair of agents have339
the same type.340
Definition 4. A network is type connected if every two agents of the same type341
is connected.342
Definition 5. An agent i has link-surplus in a given network if i’s number of links343
is lower than the degree quota.344
Definition 6. A network is sort-connected if the network (i) is perfectly sorted,345
(ii) is type connected and (iii) no agents have a link surplus in the network.346
We now turn to type self-sufficiency, which requires that there is potential for347
each type to perfectly sort and have no link surplus. This concept is important and348
plays a critical role for the existence of sort-connected networks.349
Definition 7. A type of agents x ∈ X is self-sufficient if nx > κ.350
We briefly investigate the situation when type self-sufficiency does not hold, i.e.351
nx ≤ κ for one or more types x ∈ X. This is seen from the following statement:352
Proposition 2. Suppose there is supermodularity and there is not type self-sufficiency:353
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(i) if n ≤ κ+ 1 then the complete network is the only pairwise stable network and354
the only efficient network;355
(ii) if n > κ+ 1 and there are two types where nx¯ = n
¯
x, then every network where356
every agent has nx¯− 1 same-type links, and κ−nx¯ + 1 cross-type links is stable357
and efficient.358
We move on to examining sorted connectivity in networks. We note that the359
remainder of this subsection is restricted in two ways. First, by confining our analysis360
to the setting where there is self-sufficiency for each type. Second, we exclusively361
focus on the case of hyperbolic decay as it provides for more intuitive and more362
immediate results without restrictions on the network. As noted earlier, a more363
general exposition is found in Supplementary Appendix Appendix B.364
The aim is to show that sort-connected networks are stable when the strength of365
utility from indirect connections is low to moderate. Moreover, when the strength of366
utility from indirect connections is moderate to high, the networks are suboptimal367
despite fulfilling Becker’s complementarity condition, i.e. supermodularity. We will368
see that the suboptimality arises because the network is under-connected relative to369
the efficient network.370
We begin our analysis by presenting an illustration of the situation. We want371
to show that for strength of utility from indirect connections below the threshold,372
δstab, any network with sorted connectivity is also pairwise stable. Moreover, we will373
show that there exist networks with higher aggregate utility when utility exceeds374
another threshold, δopt. In order to motivate and capture the intuition we provide375
simplified results in Example 1. The example is based on hyperbolic decay of network376
externalities, however, it can be easily adapted to constant decay.14 The example is377
graphically represented in Figure 1.378
Example 1. There are six agents; three of high type (1,2,3) and three of low type379
(4,5,6). Moreover, there is supermodularity, degree quota of two (κ=2) and hyperbolic380
decay. Define two networks: a network with sorted connectivity, µ = {12, 13, 23, 45, 46, 56},381
see Figure 1.A; a sort-connected network with bridges (see Definition 8), which we382
denote as µ˜ = {12, 23, 34, 45, 56, 61}, see Figure 1.C. We show in this example that,383
for a range of decay-factors, µ is pairwise stable, yet suboptimal. In this setup there384
is a unique move which is both feasible and payoff relevant.15 This move consists in385
14In an old paper version, Bjerre-Nielsen (2015), we compute the example under constant decay
of spillovers.
15Under pairwise stability at most one link can be formed in a single move. As the value of every
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(A): Segregated network, µ.
Pairwise stable if δ ≤ δstab(Zˆ).
(B): Pairwise move by agent 1,
6 who form a link together and
remove links 13, 46.
(C): Connected network, µ˜.
Efficient if δ ≥ δopt(Zˆ).
Figure 1: Sorted network is stable but inefficient.
The above three networks depict Example 1. The network in (A) is pairwise (Nash) stable for some
parameters and the network in (B) is the only kind of feasible deviation. The network in (C) is an
efficient network.
two agents forming a link across types and both participating agents delete a link.386
Such a move could be agents 1,6 forming a link while deleting their respecetive links387
to agents 3 and 4. We denote this network µˆ = µ ∪ {16}\{13, 46} and we plot it in388
Figure 1.B. Benefits for agents 1 and 6 from network µ and deviating from it are:389
u1(µˆ) + u6(µˆ) = (1 + δ) · [z(x¯, x¯) + z(
¯
x,
¯
x)] + [1 + 2δ] · [z(x¯,
¯
x) + z(
¯
x, x¯)],
= (1 + δ) · 1
2
· [Z(x¯, x¯) + Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)] + [1 + 2δ] · Z(x¯,
¯
x),
u1(µ) + u6(µ) = 2 · [z(x¯, x¯) + z(
¯
x,
¯
x)] = Z(x¯, x¯) + Z(
¯
x,
¯
x).
We can express the condition that the deviation to µˆ is not pairwise profitable as:390
u1(µ) + u6(µ) > u1(µˆ) + u6(µˆ). This condition is sufficient for pairwise stability due391
to payoff symmetry in µ and no transfers.392
We now turn to deriving the condition for segregation to be inefficient. The393
aggregate benefits over all agents of the two networks, µ and µ˜, is expressed below in394
the two equations.395
U(µ˜) = (2 + δ) · [Z(x¯, x¯) + Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)] + [2 + 7δ] · Z(x¯,
¯
x),
U(µ) = 3 · [Z(x¯, x¯) + Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)].
link is positive it follows that a move consisting only in deletion of a link always leads to a loss.
Thus, only coalition moves where new links are formed can be valuable. All links to same type
agents are already formed in network µ. Therefore, the only feasible move consists in forming a
link to agents of the other type.
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Sorting is inefficient when: U(µ) < U(µ˜). The two inequalities governing pairwise
stability and inefficiency have the following positive solution:
δstab(Zˆ) = Zˆ
Zˆ+1
,
δopt(Zˆ) = Zˆ
Zˆ+
9
2
,
Zˆ =
Z(x¯,x¯)+Z(
¯
x,
¯
x)
2Z(x¯,
¯
x)
− 1,
where δopt and δstab are thresholds for, respectively, when network µ becomes ineffi-396
cient, and unstable when δ increases.397
The example above demonstrates that sorting can be inefficient when there are398
network effects despite there being complementarity in type, i.e. supermodular link399
values. The inefficiency stems from a novel source - the pairwise formation of links.400
The intuition is that under pairwise deviation the two agents do not internalize the401
total value created for the other agents; number of indirect links between a high and402
a low agent. Note that the above example has a close correspondence to Propositions403
1 and 6 from de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) and that their results also holds only for404
cliques with very few agents (≤ 5), see literature review.405
We proceed with a generalization of the example above which holds for various406
structures of the subnetworks within types and for multiple types. The aim is to407
extend the above example to a less restrictive setting for sorted connectivity. Below408
is our first general result where we establish sufficient and necessary conditions for409
the existence of networks with sorted connectivity.410
Proposition 3 (Existence). The set of sort-connected networks is non-empty if and411
only if all of the following conditions hold:412
i) there is self-sufficiency for each type;413
ii) more than one partner is allowed.414
iii) either the degree quota is even or there is an even number of agents of each type;415
The conditions in Proposition 3 are listed in order of importance. The essential416
condition is self-sufficiency, which ensures that there are enough links for each type417
to perfectly sort. The second condition of the degree quota exceeding one, is obvious418
as otherwise the problem would reduce to a simple one-to-one matching problem and419
type connectivity would not be possible. The final condition requiring either even420
numbered quota of links or even number of agents for each type is a little subtle. The421
reason is technical; if both of these conditions are not met then the total demand for422
links of the same type is uneven when there is no link surplus but each link takes up423
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a capacity of two and thus must be an even number; the implication is that perfect424
sorting and no link surplus is incompatible when this even number condition is not425
met. We discuss the choice of equilibrium concepts in the discussion found in Section426
5.427
We move on to investigate stability and optimality of the network structure. We428
now generalize the thresholds from Example 1. These thresholds for stability and429
optimality hold for any number of types and number of agents for each type. Note430
that for optimality the value provided below is an upper bound of threshold value.431
δstab = min
x,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜|·zˆx,x˜
)
, zˆx,x˜ =
z(x, x˜)
Z(x, x˜)
(6)
δ¯opt = min
x,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+
1
2
nxnx˜
)
, Zˆx,x˜ =
Z(x,x)+Z(x˜,x˜)
2Z(x,x˜)
− 1 (7)
Using the first threshold above we can express our main result on the stability432
of sort-connected networks. Note that an alternative version of the above theorem433
under constant decay can be found in Appendix Appendix B in Theorem 3.434
Theorem 1 (Stability). Suppose there is supermodularity, then every sort-connected435
network is pairwise stable if δ ≤ δstab; moreover, if there are only two types and sort-436
connected networks exist, then every pairwise network is also sort-connected.437
We have shown general stability of sort-connected networks. Moreover, when438
there are only two types, our results from Theorem 1 are substantially stronger. We439
establish that sorting is the unique pairwise stable outcome for low to moderate levels440
of externalities (i.e. δ < δstab).441
We emphasize that Theorem 1 and δstab have implications for understanding the442
instability of perfect sorting in networks. For sufficiently high levels of spillover, i.e.443
δ > δstab, it holds that sorted networks are never pairwise stable. The reason is444
that agents of different types can benefit jointly by mutually forming a link and each445
breaking a same type link.446
One can view Theorem 1 as generalizing not only Example 1 but also Propositions447
1.ii and 4.iii from de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017), who require that there are very few448
agents, two types and all agents of a given type link with one another.449
We move on to discussing another main property of sort-connected networks,450
namely optimality, i.e. whether the network structure is efficient. In order to state451
our results we introduce a related network which has efficiency properties for mod-452
erate to high strength of utility from indirect connections.453
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Definition 8. Let a bridged, sort-connected network be a sort-connected network454
where (i) for at least two types exactly one link is broken, (ii) each agent with a broken455
link forms exactly one link to other agents across types who also have a link broken.456
It is important to understand that in our model moving to a bridged, sort-457
connected network require two links to be established across types from a sort-458
connected network. This is a technical condition stemming from the fact that re-459
ducing the number of links among the same type by one frees up the capacity to460
establish a link by two agents; as a consequence it is possible for two links across461
types to be established. Using both of these possible links is important for establish-462
ing efficiency. It will turn out to also be important in the investigation of policy, see463
Proposition 4.464
Theorem 2 (Efficiency). Suppose there is supermodularity, then the thresholds for465
efficiency and stability satisfy δ¯opt < δstab. Any sort-connected network is inefficient466
when δ < δopt where it holds that δopt ≤ δ¯opt. Finally, if there are two types then, sort-467
connected network are efficient when δ ≤ δ¯opt, while bridged, sort-connected networks468
are efficient for δ ≥ δ¯opt.469
The above theorem generalizes Example 1 by showing that under-connected net-470
works with too little linking across sorted groups of agents occur more generally. It471
also extends Proposition 6 from de Mart´ı and Zenou (2017) by removing the restric-472
tion to two types and linking between all same type agents as well as doing away473
with the limitation of having very few agents. Again, with only two types of agents474
the results are considerably stronger. We can show that the threshold for inefficiency475
now governs whether it is the sort-connected network or the bridged, sort-connected476
network that is efficient.477
A visualization of the computed thresholds of externalities when there are two478
types is found in Figure 2. The thresholds are computed for varying population479
size and varying strength of complementarity. These plots can be seen as providing480
comparative statics along these two dimensions. The upper part of the figure keeps481
the population size fixed while lower ones keep the complementarity strength fixed.482
From inspection it is evident that both of the connection thresholds are approxi-483
mately linear in log-log scale. This pattern suggests that both of the thresholds fol-484
low power-laws in the number of agents and strength of complementarity. Note that485
it is also straightforward to mathematically derive these patterns from the threshold486
definitions. Note also that it is possible to do a comparative static in the number of487
types. For example, if we assume that all same type agents get a certain payoff and488
cross type relations get some fraction of that, as in Jackson and Rogers (2005), then489
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increasing the number of islands keeps the gain from pairwise deviation constant,490
but the gains in efficiency increase.491
The remainder of this subsection will sketch a policy intervention that can mit-492
igate the problem of suboptimal sorting by improving welfare through encouraging493
connection. These interventions can be seen more generally as a design problem,494
where the policy maker intervenes to induce a network that produces higher welfare.495
The tool that the policy maker employs is providing incentives to agents for forming496
specific links. Note that two agents of each type may need to be compensated. This497
stems from the fact that when compensating one agent to establish a link across498
types the agent to which it has deleted a link has an incentive to form a new link,499
which will potentially destabilize the sub-networks for each type. We discuss this500
assumption and how it relates to our choice of model in Section 5.501
Define a link-contingent contract as a non-negative transfer, Cij, paid to i for502
linking with another agent j. Denote the vector of link-contingent contract as C. We503
start demonstrating our results on intervention through a continuation of Example 1.504
505
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Figure 2: Thresholds for connecting.
Visualization of thresholds for connecting from Theorems 1 and 2. The upper part shows varying
sizes of populations and fixed strength of complementarity. The lower part has varying strength of
complementarity and fixed population sizes. It is assumed that there are two types which have an
identical number of agents.
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Example 1 (continued) Let strength of utility from indirect connections satisfy506
δ < δstab and assume that there is a policy maker who can issue link-contingent507
transfers as follows. We suppose that the policy maker offers conditional transfers508
such that the pairwise net-utility for agents 1,6 and agents 3,4 from forming a link509
satisfies:510
Cij+Cji = − [(1− δ) · (z(x, x) + z(x˜, x˜)) + (1 + 2δ) · z(x, x˜)]+ε, ij ∈ 16, 34, ε > 0
Agents 1,6 and 3,4 have an incentive to form a link and break their existing links (i.e.511
{13, 46}). This implies that a deviation from the sort-connected network µ to the512
bridged, sort-connected network µ˜ is possible; see the networks depicted in Figure 1.513
We round off the example by noting that if δ > δopt, then the deviation to the bridged,514
sort-connected network raises aggregate utility.515
516
We now generalize the insight from the continuation of Example 1 into the follow-517
ing proposition. This proposition holds for an arbitrary number of agents when there518
are two types. We need to define an auxiliary term to describe the interventions:519
Definition 9. Let a network µ˜ be implementable from µ, τ given C if there exist520
a sequence of tuples (µ0, τ0), .., (µl, τl) where µ0 = µ, µl = µ˜, and τl = τ such that:521
for q = 1, .., l from µq−1 to µq is a feasible pairwise move which increases the pair’s522
net-utility most given C, and; µ˜ is pairwise stable given τq and C.523
Proposition 4 (Implementation). Suppose that there are two types, supermodularity524
and δ < δstab. It follows that a policy maker can implement a bridged, sort-connected525
network from any sort-connected network.526
The above result shows it is possible to have agents deviate to implement the527
bridged, sort-connected networks by offering link-contingent contracts. By combining528
the proposition with earlier results on inefficiency, it follows directly that:529
Corollary 1. If conditions for Proposition 4 hold and δ > δ¯opt it follows that imple-530
mentening the bridged, sort-connected network will result in higher welfare.531
The intuition of the corollary is that efficiency can be restored by compensating532
certain agents. Recall that in our model conditionality of transfers exist only between533
agents who are linked. This lack of conditionality for third parties implies that534
agents cannot fully internalize positive spillovers. Therefore, it is not surprising that535
efficiency is restored when allowing a third party, i.e. the policy maker, to transfer536
utility conditional on certain links as has been shown previously (Bloch and Jackson,537
2007). We note that Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 outline a centralized intervention538
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by a policy maker but it could also have been solved decentrally through conditional539
transfer by other agents, as in the framework of Bloch and Jackson (2007).540
We note that the individual compensation paid to agents for connecting to others541
may not be equal. In particular, the payment may also depend on the types. This542
is the case when there is both supermodularity and monotonicity in Z. If these543
conditions hold, then agents may receive compensation that is increasing with their544
type.545
4.2. Infinite population - constant decay in spillovers546
We finalize this section by investigating what pattern of linking is exhibited when547
the count of agents becomes asymptotically infinite. In this large matching market548
we examine asymptotic perfect sorting, i.e. when the measured share of links to549
same-type agents converges to one. We employ the constant decay to measure utility550
from indirect connections as hyperbolic decay yield infinite payoff for any connected551
network with infinite number of agents. Note that we also use a stronger equilibrium552
concept, strong stability, which allows for coordination between coalitions of any size.553
Definition 10. Let asymptotic perfect sorting hold for a sequence of networks554
sets, Mn, if for any network, µ ∈ Mn, where n → ∞, it holds that |{ij ∈ µ : xi =555
xj}|/|µ| ' 1.556
Define asymptotic independence as δ < (κ − 1)−1. For large matching markets557
the sufficient conditions for asymptotic perfect sorting to emerge in strongly stable558
networks are:559
Proposition 5. If there is supermodularity, a degree quota and constant decay with560
asymptotic independence, then there is asymptotic perfect sorting for strongly stable561
networks.562
The result above demonstrates that the availability of many agents for linking563
induces perfect sorting in strongly stable networks. It demonstrates the same pre-564
diction as the conclusion of Becker (1973) for the marriage market model but holds565
in the presence of externalities with constant decay.566
For deriving the result we exploit strong stability which implies that efficiency567
holds. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that asymptotic efficiency requires asymp-568
totic perfect sorting. Although efficiency is a unique property for strong stability569
(and does not hold for weaker concepts) it can be argued that strong stability should570
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be seen as a refinement with desirable properties which makes it more likely when it571
exists.16572
We conclude this section by noting that we may interpret the result on sorting573
for infinite populations differently; there is no loss from sorting when there are many574
agents.575
5. Concluding discussion576
We have extended the assortative matching framework to a setting of networks.577
We have shown that in a general context that Becker’s condition for sorting is still578
essential for stability. However, the same condition is insufficient for efficiency (when579
there is a finite population). The context is where types have enough members to580
form a community among themselves. We have sketched a policy that can help581
overcome this issue.582
We have chosen to model costs implicitly via a degree quota in order to have583
comparability with the matching literature. We expect, however, that our results584
should easily translate to the standard connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky585
(1996). In this other setup we expect that the intuition should transfer when limiting586
the number of sub-networks within types to be either cliques or stars, as in de Mart´ı587
and Zenou (2017). One advantage of translating the setup to the linear cost frame-588
work of the standard networks literature would be that the technical assumption of589
either even degree or an even number of agents for each type would not be necessary.590
Under hyperbolic decay one would also get a more natural efficient policy solution591
requiring only a single agent of each type to bridge the gap between their respective592
subnetworks.593
Our analysis is based on other strict assumptions which we now review. We594
begin by noting that search frictions are important and have received attention in595
the literature (Chade et al., 2017) but for the sake of tractability we focus on a596
frictionless model. There are also a number of restrictive assumptions on payoff. The597
most crucial assumptions are payoff separability and fixed structure of externalities.598
Further research could explore how results generalize to less restrictive utility from599
indirect connections captured by the decay parameter, δ. For instance, does there600
exist a set of criteria that are more general than constant or hyperbolic decay for601
which our results hold. It is likely that our results are robust to including utility from602
16In some circumstances the existence of contracts where an agent may subsidize or penalize
another agent’s link formation with alternative agents may imply strong stability even if contracts
were limited to being pairwise specified, cf. Bloch and Jackson (2007).
21
network measures, e.g. triadic closure/clustering, that are common in the literature603
within economics on networks. Other critical assumptions are supermodularity and604
perfect transferability. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction, these two605
assumptions can be replaced by monotonicity in individual link values and perfect606
non-transferability, which is also in line with some research on peer effects.17 Finally,607
the model relies on some agents being of different types but it should be possible to608
remove this assumption.18609
Another caveat with our analysis, and stable networks in general, is that these610
networks may not exist. We have shown some properties of existence under regularity611
conditions of sort-connected networks, see Propositions 3 and 1. However, beyond612
sort-connected networks we do not offer much in the case of externalities. The gross613
substitutes conditions from Kelso and Crawford (1982), which ensure existence of614
stable matchings in related settings, are not satisfied in our setting with external-615
ities.19 Nevertheless, by changing the equilibrium concept we expect that some of616
the lack of existence could be solved. One approach is using farsighted stability,617
as in Chwe (1994); Dutta et al. (2005); Herings et al. (2009). Another approach is618
using some approximative equilibrium concept e.g. cost of stability (the necessary619
payments to induce stability) from Bachrach et al. (2009).620
Appendix A. Proofs621
Lemma 1. In the absence of network externalities then the set of strongly stable622
networks is equivalent to the set of pairwise stable networks.623
Proof. By definition it holds that any strongly stable network is pairwise stable.624
Thus, we need to show that any pairwise network is strongly stable. This claim is625
shown using similar to arguments to Klaus and Walzl (2009)’s Theorem 3.i.626
Let µ with associated contracts τ be a network which is blocked by a coalition. It627
will be shown that for every coalition t ∈ T that blocks, within the coalition there is628
a subset of no more than two members that also wishes to block the network. Let µ˜629
be the alternative network that the blocking coalitions implements through a feasible630
coalition move and τ be the transfers associated with µ˜.631
17Or, more broadly, by generalized increasing in differences from Legros and Newman (2007).
18The more extreme case is where all agents have different types, e.g., they exist in a ring with
local complementarities, similar to Johnson and Gilles (2000) who assume agents’ types are defined
on a line. In this setting it may be that stable networks have the property that agents only link
with the most similar agents and thus fail to connect with those further away.
19The lack of gross substitutes is due to the fact that a change in one active link can imply a
change in the value of other links. This fact will violate gross substitutes.
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It is always possible to partition the set of deleted links µ\µ˜ into two: (i) a632
subset denoted µˆ where for each link ij that can be deleted where one of the two633
partners can benefit, i.e. it holds that either zij + τij − [ci(µ) − ci(µ\ij)] < 0 or634
zji+ τji− [cj(µ)− ci(µ\ij)] < 0; (ii) a subset denoted µ˘ where for each link ij neither635
of the previous two inequalities are satisfied.636
Suppose that the first partition is non-empty, i.e. µˆ 6= ∅. However, as deleting637
links can be done by a single agent on its own then the move only takes needs the638
coalition of that agent to delete the link. Thus any part of a coalitional move that639
only involves profitably removing links can be performed in parts by a coalition with640
a single agent - therefore this move is also a pairwise block.641
Thus it remains to be shown that the remaining part of coalitional move also642
can be performed as a pairwise block, i.e. when forming µ˜\µ and deleting µ˘. This643
part of the coalitional move must entail forming links as no links can be deleted644
profitably. The set of formed links µ˜\µ can be partitioned into a number of |µ˜\µ|645
feasible submoves of adding a single link while deleting links by each of the agents i646
and j who form a link. The feasibility for each of the partitioned moves is always true647
when there is a cost function as moves are unrestricted. It is now argued that each648
of the partitioned moves are feasible when there is a degree quota. If the network649
µ ∪ ij is feasible then the move of simply adding the link is feasible. If µ ∪ ij is not650
feasible, then agents i and j can delete at most one link each and if both µ and µ˜651
are feasible then this also feasible as the degree quota is kept.652
For the coalitional move to µ˜ it must be that at least at least one link among653
the implemented links µ˜\µ has a strictly positive value that exceeds the loss from654
deleting at most one link for each of two agents forming the link. This follows as it655
is known that deleting one or more links cannot add any value and thus must have656
weakly negative value and that by definition the total value to the blocking coalition657
must be positive. As every one of the partitioned moves is feasible, it follows that658
for every coalitional move there are two agents who can form link while potentially659
destroying current links and both be better off. In other words, for every coalition660
that blocks, there is a pairwise coalition that blocks.661
Proof of Proposition 1.. Suppose the claim is false. Let q be the lowest index for662
which the condition fail: for all l < q it holds that X (νi(µ)/{j})l ≥ X (νj(µ)/{i})l+l∗663
where l∗ = max(kj(µ)− ki(µ), 0). Thus there are two agents i′, j′ such that:664
xj′ = X (νj(µ))q, j′ ∈ (νj(µ)\(νi(µ) ∪ {i})),
xi′ < X (νj(µ))q, i′ ∈ (νi(µ)\(νj(µ) ∪ {j})).
Recall k∗ = min(ki(µ), kj(µ)). The argument why there must exist an agent i′ in665
νj(µ) but not in (νj(µ)∪{j}) is that |{ι ∈ νi(µ) : xι < xj′}| > |{ι ∈ νj(µ) : xι < xj′}|.666
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This follows as by construction it holds that |{ι ∈ νi(µ) : xι < xj′}| = k∗− q+ 1 and667
|{ι ∈ νj(µ) : xι < xj′}| ≤ k∗ − q.668
The agents are such that xi > xj, xi′ < xj′ as well as ij
′, ji′ /∈ µ. However,669
this fact implies that there is a violation of strong stability: agents i, i′, j, j′ can670
deviate by destroying {ij, i′j′} and forming {ij′, i′j} and thus increase payoffs due to671
supermodularity (cf. Equation 2). From Lemma 1 it follows that pairwise stability672
is also violated if strong stability is violated. 673
Proof of Proposition 2:. Condition (i) follows from the fact that it is possible for674
every agent to be linked with one another. Moreover every link adds value. Thus as675
a consequence every link can be formed and will add value both for the pair forming676
and it at the aggregate level; thus the unique pairwise and efficient outcome must677
be the complete network.678
We move on to proving condition (ii). Suppose µ is a network where every agent679
has nx¯ − 1 same-type links and κ− nx¯ + 1 cross-type links.680
Efficiency of µ follows from three facts. Firstly, µ the maximum distance of 2681
between any two agents as all same-type links are active and all agents have at682
least one cross-type link; thus the potential benefits from indirect connections are683
maximized (both for constant and hyperbolic decay). Secondly, the number of same684
type links are maximized for all agents and this will maximize the benefits from685
direct links; thus there must exactly nx¯ − 1 same type links. Finally, there can be686
no link surplus because violation there exist a network where every agent has nx¯− 1687
same-type links and κ − nx¯ + 1 cross-type links and thus has no link surplus; this688
must have strictly higher aggregate utility as every direct link increases utility.689
Stability of µ follows from reviewing the feasible deviations. Let there be no690
transfers between any agents. Firstly, deleting one or more links is profitable as691
it lowers the agents own welfare. Secondly, forming a link requires deletion of one692
or more links by both agents. Deleting more links than one will lower the utility693
this only the deviations with deletion of a single link are relevant to consider - this694
corresponds to substitution of a link. Substituting either a same type link for another695
same type link or a cross type link for another cross type provides no change of utility696
to the pair of agents deviating. Substituting a cross type link for a same type link697
is not feasible. Substituting a same type link for a cross type link will lower the698
utility as the indirect benefits are unchanged but the direct benefits must be lower699
on aggregate due to supermodularity. 700
Lemma 2. For every κ, n such that n > κ and n·κ is even there exists a network µn,κ701
where all agents have exactly κ neighbors. Moreover, if κ ≥ 2 then µn,κ is connected.702
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Proof. Suppose n is even. Let % be the modulus operator. We can construct the703
following networks.704
µˆn,κ =
{
ij : i ∈ {1, ..., n
2
}, j ∈ {(n
2
+ i% n
2
), ..., (n
2
+ [i+ κ− 1] % n
2
})} , κ ≤ n
2
,
µ˜n,κ =
{
µˆn,κ, κ ≤ n2 ,
µc\µˆn,n−κ−1, κ > n2 .
Letting µn,κ = µ˜n,κ is sufficient for n is even. When n is odd we know that κ is705
even and thus we can use the following amended procedure instead:706
ιn,κ(ι) =
{
n−1
2
+ ι, κ ≤ n−1
2
n−1
2
+ (ι+ κ) % n−1
2
, κ > n−1
2
707
µn,κ = µ˜n−1,κ\
{
ij : i ∈ {1, .., κ
2
}, j = ιn,κ(i)
} ∪ {ij : i = n, j ∈ (∪
ι{1,.., κ
2
}{ι, ιn,κ(ι)})}
We now show that if κ ≥ 2 it follows that µ˜n,κ is connected. Assume that n is708
even and suppose κ ≤ n
2
; for any i ∈ N : i < n
2
where i′ = i+ 1 and let j = n
2
+ i+ 1709
where ij, i′j ∈ µ˜n,κ; thus for all i, i′ ∈ {1, .., n2} it holds that pii′(µ˜n,κ) < ∞. In710
addition, as for any i ∈ N : i ≤ n
2
, j = n
2
+ i it holds that ij ∈ µ˜n,κ it follows that µ˜n,κ711
is connected. If instead κ > n
2
then by construction ii′ ∈ µ˜n,κ if either max(i, i′) ≤ n2712
or min(i, i′) > n
2
as ii′ /∈ µˆn,n−κ−1. Moreover, for i ∈ N : i < n2 and j = n2 +(i+κ) % n2713
it holds that ij /∈ µˆn,n−κ−1; thus ij ∈ µ˜n,κ. Therefore µ˜n,κ must be connected.714
Assume instead that n is odd. By the above argument there are at least two715
connected subnetworks consisting of agents in ∪
ι{1,.., κ
2
}{ι, ιn,κ(ι)} and agents who are716
connected through agent, n, i.e. N\(∪
ι{1,.., κ
2
}{ι, ιn,κ(ι)}). If κ ≤ n−12 where i = κ2 ,717
i′ = κ
2
+ 1 and j = n−1
2
+ κ
2
+ 1 then ij, i′j ∈ µ˜n,κ and thus µ˜n,κ is connected. If718
κ > n−1
2
where i = κ
2
, i′ = κ
2
+ 1 and j = n−1
2
+ (ι + κ + 1) % n−1
2
then ij, i′j ∈ µ˜n,κ719
and thus µ˜n,κ is connected.720
Lemma 3. Suppose that minx∈X nx > κ, κ ≥ 2. If ∃i ∈ N such that:721
a) |{i′ ∈ νi(µ) : xi′ = xi}| ≤ nx − 2;722
b) mini′∈Nx\νi(µ) ki′(µ) = κ, and;723
c) maxi′∈Nx\νi(µ) |{i′′ ∈ νi′(µ) : xi′′ 6= x}| = 0;724
then ∃i′, i′′ ∈ µ such that i′, i′′ /∈ νi(µ) and pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′}) <∞725
Proof. Suppose that for i ∈ N the conditions a)-c) are met but the lemma is not726
true. If i′ ∈ Nx and ii′ /∈ µ then there must exist some i′′ ∈ Nx such that i′i′′ ∈ µ and727
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i′′ /∈ νi(µ) due to conditions a)-c). If pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′}) <∞ then the proof is terminated728
so we must assume pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′}) =∞.729
As pi′i′′(µ\{i′i′′}) = ∞ then the network µ\{i′i′′} has two components, µ′, µ′′ ⊆730
µ\({i′i′′}, where in each component µ′ or µ′′ there are at least κ + 1 agents of type731
x (as for any ι ∈ (νi′(µ) ∪ νi′′(µ)) it holds that xι = x).732
Agent i can at most be connected to one of i′, i′′ in µ\({i′i′′}) as otherwise i′, i′′733
would be connected in µ\{i′i′′}. Denote the in subnetwork of {µ′, µ′′} where i is part734
of as µ˜ and define N˜ = {ι ∈ Nx\νi(µ) : ∃ι′ ∈ N : ιι′ ∈ µ˜}.735
Let ι0 ∈ arg maxι∈i′,i′′ pιi and iteratively ιl ∈ νιl−1(µ), l ∈ N. Moreover, there must736
be a unique path in µ\{i′i′′} between any two agents ι, ι′ ∈ N˜ as otherwise iι, iι′ /∈ µ737
but pιι′(µ˜\{i′i′′}) <∞; by changing the labels we could denote i′ = ι and i′′ = ι′ and738
we would have shown the existence of the desired pair of agents.739
The fact here is a unique path between any two agents in N˜ entails that at level l740
or below there are
∑l
q=0(κ−1)q agents; thus nx ≥
∑l
q=0(κ−1)q. Let l be the minimal741
q such that ∀ ∈ ι ∈ N˜ : piι ≤ q; as nx is finite such a q must exist. In addition, as742
there is a unique path between agents in µ then any agent ι ∈ N˜ : pιι0 = l has only743
one link, and thus its degree is less than κ (as κ ≥ 2). This violates the condition744
that all i′ ∈ N where xi′ = x has ki′ = κ.745
Proof Proposition 3.. The sufficiency of the conditions follows from Lemma 2 which746
can be applied to the subset of agents associated with each type as ∀x ∈ X : nx > κ747
and κ · nx ∈ 2N.748
The necessity of the conditions are straighforward. If either condition i) or iii)749
are violated then perfect sorting is not consistent with no-link surplus. If condition750
ii) is violated then there can be no type connectivity. 751
Proof Theorem 1..752
Networks with sorted connectivity are stable Suppose µ that has sorted753
connectivity. We will demonstrate there are thresholds on δ such that µ has pairwise754
stability. We’re only interested in the minimal thresholds such that for all values of755
externalities below those then stability holds. Thus it is sufficient to evaluate the756
deviations from the network where the net gains are highest.757
The losses from breaking a link ij ∈ µ can be shown to have bounded from below758
such that: ≥ δ · (1 − Z(x, x)). Suppose that nx = κ + 1, x ∈ X then {ij ∈ µ :759
xi = x, xi′ = x} is a clique (i.e. any i, i′ of type x are linked). This entails that760
pii′(µ\{ii′}) = 2 and thus pii′(µ\{ii′}) <∞. Suppose instead that nx > κ+ 1, x ∈ X761
then by Lemma 3 there exists some i, i′, both of type x such that pii′(µ\{ii′}) <∞.762
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Thus when evaluating losses at the threshold we can assume that when deleting some763
link ij that i, j are connected in µ\{ij}. Although the length of the shortest paths764
may increase, there will still be an indirect connection and therefore no loss of utility765
for anyone but the two agents who lose their link. Therefore we assume throughout766
that when evaluating thresholds if ii′ is deleted in a sort-connected network then767
only agents i, i′, who must be of same type, will each lose (1 − δ) · z(x, x) while no768
other agents incur a loss.769
Suppose two agents i, j of distinct types respectively x, x˜ deviate by forming a770
link and delete a link each from µ. The total loss for i and j for deleting a link each771
is:772
(1− δ) · [z(x, x) + z(x˜, x˜)] = (1− δ) · (Zˆx,x˜ + 1) · Z(x, x˜).
The benefit gained for agent i for establishing a link to j is [1 + (nx˜ − 1) · (1 −773
δ)] · z(x, x˜). Thus the total benefits gained for i and j from pairwise deviation can774
be bounded as follows:775
[1 + (nx − 1) · δ] · z(x, x˜) + [1 + (nx˜ − 1) · δ] · z(x˜, x),
= 〈1 + [max(nx, nx˜)− |nx − nx˜| · zˆx,x˜ − 1] · δ〉 · Z(x, x˜).
where zˆx,x˜ =
z(arg minx,x˜ nx, arg maxx,x˜ nx)
Z(x,x˜)
.776
We can derive the threshold for pairwise stability, see definition of Zˆ from Eq.777
(7). :778
(1− δ) · (Zˆx,x˜ + 1) · Z(x, x˜) = 〈1 + [max(nx, nx˜)− |nx − nx˜| · zˆx,x˜ − 1] · δ〉 · Z(x, x˜),
(1− δ) · (Zˆx,x˜ + 1) = 〈1 + [max(nx, nx˜)− |nx − nx˜| · zˆx,x˜ − 1] · δ〉 ,
Zˆx,x˜ =
[
max(nx, nx˜)− |nx − nx˜| · zˆx,x˜ + Zˆx,x˜
]
· δ,
δ =
Zˆx,x˜
max(nx, nx˜)− |nx − nx˜| · zˆx,x˜ + Zˆx,x˜
. (A.1)
Thus we can establish a lower bound for δstab (i.e. the upper bound in δ for779
pairwise stability of µ) by taking the minimum of right-hand-side in Equation A.1;780
thus it follows that: δstab = minx,x˜∈X
(
Zˆx,x˜
max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜|·zˆx,x˜+Zˆx,x˜
)
. 781
Pairwise stable networks have sorted connectivity when there are two782
types We need to show that every pairwise stable network is sort-connected. As783
there are only two types it holds that X = {x, x}. The outline of the proof is the784
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we show the conditions in the following order; we begin with perfect sorting, then785
no link surplus, and finally type connectedness.786
787
Perfect sorting We begin by supposing that µ is not perfectly sorted. We will788
construct a sequence of feasible deviations and show that they are profitable. As this789
part of the proof has considerable length it will be split into multiple sub-parts with790
a label that makes it easier to navigate.791
792
Sequence of deviations The sequence of feasible deviations will consist of splitting793
up links between agents of different type and matching at even steps agents of type794
x and at odd steps agents of type x˜.795
We first define sequences of agents and of deviations as steps q = 1, 2, .., l where796
l is the number of steps. At each step we define the types as xq = x, x˜q = x˜ if q is797
even else vice versa.798
Let the sequence of agent pairs, i0j0, i1j1, ... be defined as follows. Let agents799
i0, j0 ∈ N be such that xi 6= xj and ij ∈ µ; such i0, j0 must exist if µ is not perfectly800
sorted. Without loss of generality let xi0 = x and xj0 = x˜ where x, x˜ ∈ X. At step801
q ∈ N let ιq = iq−1 if q is even else denote ιq = jq−1. Also let ηq ∈ {iq−1, jq−1} : ηq 6= ιq.802
The advantage of this notation it is easier to define which links are formed between803
same type agents. Note that by construction we have that ι1 = i0 and η1 = j0 as804
well as xιq = xq and xηq = xq.805
Using the sequence of agent pairs we construct the sequence of deviations as806
follows.807
• At every step q = 1, .., l a link is ιqηq (=iqjq) is broken. We assume that broken808
links are elements of the original set, i.e. ιqηq ∈ µ and can only be broken once809
ιqηq /∈ ∪q−1m=1{ιmηm}.810
• At every step q = 1, .., l a link is formed ιqι′q /∈ µ. This corresponds to iqiq−1 /∈ µ811
if q is odd and jqjq−1 /∈ µ if q is even. We assume that formed links are not812
part of the original set µ and can only be formed once ιqι
′
q /∈ ∪q−1m=1{ιmι′m}..813
• Combining the broken and formed links we get the coalitional move relative to
µ:
∆µq =µ ∪ {ιqι′q}\{ιqηq, ι′qη′q}, q = 1, .., l − 1 (A.2)
∆µl =
{
µ ∪ {ιlι′l}\{ιlηl, ι′lη′l}, kιl(µ) = κ
µ ∪ {ιlι′l}\{ιlηl}, kι′l(µ) < κ
(A.3)
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We note that the above sequence exists as we can always pick l = 1 and the814
assumption of having a broken link and link formed are satisfied by assumption.815
816
Feasible partners We have defined the sequences of agents and deviations. We817
now restrict the set of partners at each step q for agent ιq for q = 1, .., l:818
Nq = {ι ∈ N : xι = xq}
Nˆq = {ι ∈ Nq\{ιq} : ιιq /∈ µ}
A property of Nˆq is that Nˆq 6= ∅; this follows as minxˆ∈X nxˆ ≥ κ+ 1. We will now819
show that our restrictions on partner set has implications at each step q = 1, .., l:820
• Let ι′q ∈ Nˆq; this implies that Eq. (A.4) holds. This follows as a violation of821
Eq. (A.4) would imply that some agent ι′′q of type xq would connected only822
through ηq; thus ιq could link with ι
′′
q instead of ι
′
q and thus ιq can keep all its823
connections to agents who it was already connected to via ηq.824
|{ι ∈ N : xι = xq ∧ pιιq(µ) <∞ ∧ pιιq(µ ∪ {ιqι′q}\{ηqιq}) =∞}| = 0 (A.4)
• Suppose that Equation A.5 is violated for for q ∈ {1, .., l}. This is equivalent to825
it holds for any ι′q ∈ Nˆq where η′q ∈ νι′q(µ) that there is some other ι′′q ∈ Nˆq such826
that pι′qι′′q (∆µq) =∞. Let ι(1)q = ι′q. As Equation A.5 must hold for any ι′q ∈ Nˆq827
we can reproduce the argument iteratively and thus for ι
(m)
q ∈ Nˆq, q ∈ N there828
is some η
(m)
q ∈ νι(m)q (µ) such that for some ι
(m+1)
q ∈ Nˆq\{ι(1)q , .., ι(m)q } it holds829
that p
ι
(1)
q ι
(m+1)
q
(∆µq) = ∞. However, as n < ∞ it follows that there for some830
q ∈ N that Nˆq\{ι(1)q , .., ι(m)q } = ∅. Thus let instead ι′q = ι(m)q ; for any η′q ∈ νι′q(µ)831
there is no ι′′q ∈ Nˆq such that pι′qι′′q (µ) = ∞. This contradicts that Equation832
A.5 is violated for agent ι′q = ι
(m)
q .833
|{ι ∈ N : xι = xq ∧ pιι′q(µ) <∞ ∧ pιι′q(∆µq) =∞}| = 0 (A.5)
• Suppose Eq. (A.4) and (A.5) hold. We can demonstrate a variation of Eq.834
(A.4) where pιιq(∆µq) <∞, i.e. the ι and ιq are connected despite the deletion835
of η′qι
′
q, see Eq. (A.6) below. The argument why Eq. (A.6) holds is as follows.836
Suppose ∃ι ∈ N : pιιq(µ ∪ {ιqι′q}\{ιqηq}) <∞ and pιιq(∆µq) =∞ and xι = xq.837
If pιqι′q(µ) < ∞ then as it also holds that pιqι′q(∆µq) < ∞ it follows that838
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pιι′q(µ) < ∞ and pιι′q(∆µq) = ∞ which violates Eq. (A.5). Thus it must839
be that pιqι′q(µ) = ∞. Suppose instead pιqι′q(µ) = ∞. Then it must be that840
pιη′q(µ) <∞ and thus pιι′q(µ) <∞ as ι′qη′q ∈ µ which violates that pιqι′′q (µ) =∞.841
|{ι ∈ N : xι = xq ∧ pιιq(µ) <∞ ∧ pιιq(∆µq) =∞}| = 0 (A.6)
Gains from deviation We now move on to describing the gains to individuals from842
deviating. We assume initial transfers satisfy:843
−τi0j0 > (1− δ) · z(x˜, x˜)− [1 + (nx˜ − 1) · δ] · z(x˜, x). (A.7)
The above inequality must hold for either type x or x˜ as we substitute labels for844
i, j as well as x, x˜ due to Υ > 0.845
By inserting i, j for ι, η we yield the following expression:846
l−1∑
q=l′
∆Uq =
l−2∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq + uι′l−1(∆µl−1)− uι′l−1(µ) + uιl′ (∆µl′)− uιl′ (µ) (A.8)
Suppose that at every q ∈ N : q < l it holds that ι′q /∈ νιq(µ), xι′l = xl and let847
η′l ∈ νι′l(µ). ) and let:848
∆Uq = uιq(∆µq)− uιq(µ) + uι′q(∆µq)− uι′q(µ) (A.9)
∆Uˆq = uiq(∆µq+1q:even)− uiq(µ) + ujq(∆µq+1q:odd)− ujq(µ) (A.10)
We define the auxiliary term Υ below which is useful for bounding the gains from849
deviation. As δ < δstab it follows from Equation A.1 that Υ > 0.850
Υ = (1−δ)·[z(x¯, x¯)+z(
¯
x,
¯
x)]−[1+(n
¯
x−1)·δ]·z(
¯
x, x¯)−[1+(nx¯−1)·δ]·z(x¯,
¯
x). (A.11)
Gains for ιl: As Eq. (A.4) holds it follows that net gains for ιq from deleting the851
link with ηq while forming a link together with ι
′
q can be bounded: the upper bound852
of losses is when a connection is lost to all agents of type x˜q: [1+(nq−1)·δ]·z(xq, xq);853
the lower bound of gains is (1−δ) ·z(xq, x˜q) as the distance between ιqι′q is shortened854
to 1.855
uιq(µ ∪ {ιqι′q}\{ιqηq})− uιq(µ) ≥ (1− δ) · z(xq, xq)− [1 + (nq − 1) · δ] · z(xq, x˜q)(A.12)
Analogue to the derivation of Ineq. (A.12) the net gains are bounded when Eqs.856
(A.5) and (A.6) are satisfied:857
min
ι∈{ιq ,ι′q}
[uι(∆µq)− uι(µ)] ≥ (1− δ) · z(xq, xq)− [1 + (nq − 1) · δ] · z(xq, x˜q), (A.13)
30
The first and foremost implication of Ineq. (A.13) and the fact that xiq 6= xjq is858
that:859
uiq(∆µq+1odd(q))− uiq(µ) + ujq(∆µq+1even(q))− ujq(µ) ≥ Υ. (A.14)
Another implication of Ineq. (A.7) when combined with Ineq. (A.13) is that:860
uι1(∆µ1)− uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ≥ (1− δ) · z(x, x)− [1 + (nx − 1) · δ] · z(x, x˜)− τi0j0
uι1(∆µ1)− uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ≥ Υ (A.15)
Furthermore, we can restrict transfers as follows. In order for ∆µq not to be a861
profitable pairwise deviation it must hold that:862
uιq(µ) + uι′q(µ) + τι′qη′q + τιqηq ≥ uιq(∆µq) + uι′q(∆µq)
τι′qη′q ≥ ∆Uq + τηqιq
We can rewrite the above inequality using that ι′q−1 = ηq, η
′
q−1 = ιq and thus863
τι′q−1η′q−1 = τηqιq . We also substitute in Equation A.9 and assume the above inequality864
holds for any q < l:865
τι′l−1η′l−1 ≥ ∆Ul−1 + τι′l−2η′l−2
τι′l−1η′l−1 ≥
l−1∑
q=l′
∆Uq + τι′
l′−1η
′
l′−1
(A.16)
As τηlιl = τι′l−1η′l−1 and −τιlηl = τηlιl it follows that using Equation A.8:866
−τιlηl ≥
l−1∑
q=1
∆Uq + τι′
l′−1η
′
l′−1
=
l−2∑
q=1
∆Uˆq + uι′l−1(∆µl−1)− uι′l−1(µ) + uι1(∆µ1)− uι1(µ) + τι′0η′0
=
l−2∑
q=1
∆Uˆq + uηl(∆µl−1)− uηl(µ) + uι1(∆µ1)− uι1(µ)− τι1η1 (A.17)
Gains for partners of ιl: link surplus We will now examine and find bounds on867
the benefits of deviating when we assume that kι′l(µ) < κ. As Eq. (A.4) holds it868
follows that869
uι′l(µ ∪ {ιlι′l}\{ιlηl})− uι′l(µ) ≥ (1− δ) · z(xl, xl),
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and thus uι′l(µ ∪ {ιlι′l}\{ιlηl}) > 0.870
uιl(∆µl)− uιl(µ)− τιlηl ,
≥ uιl(∆µl)− uιl(µ) + uηl(∆µl−1)− uηl(µ) +
l−2∑
q=1
∆Uˆq + uι1(∆µ1)− uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ,
≥
l−1∑
q=1
∆Uˆq + uι1(∆µ1)− uι1(µ)− τι1η1 . (A.18)
We now apply Ineqs. (A.14) and (A.15) to the above expression which implies871
that the gains for ιl from deviating are bounded below by l · Υ. As we have that872
Υ > 0 it follows that:873
uιl(µ ∪ {ιlι′l}\{ιlηl})− uιl(µ)− τιlηl > 0 (A.19)
Combining that both ιl, ι
′
l have incentive to deviate it follows their joint deviation874
is profitable which violates pairwise stability. Thus it must be that kι′l(µ) = κ.875
876
Gains for partners of ιl: dropping same type partner with no loss of connectivity
Suppose there exists ι′l ∈ Nˆl, ι′′l ∈ Nˆl\{ι′l} such that ι′lι′′l ∈ µ, pι′lι′′l (µ\{ιlηl, ι′lι′′l }) <∞ and τι′lι′′l ≤ 0. This entails that uι′l(∆µˆl) − uι′l(µ) ≥ 0 where ∆µˆl = µ ∪{ιlι′l}\{ιlηl, ι′lι′′l }. This follows from uι′l(∆µˆl) − uι′l(µ) = uι′l(∆µˆl) − uι′l(µ ∩ ∆µˆl) −
[uι′l(µ ∩∆µˆl)− uι′l(µ)] and uι′l(∆µˆl)− uι′l(µ ∩∆µˆl) ≥ 1− z(x, x) and uι′l(µ ∩∆µˆl)−
uι′l(µ) = 1− z(x, x). As τι′lι′′l ≤ 0 it follows that that utility for ι′l is:
uι′l(∆µˆl)− uι′l(µ)− τι′lι′′l ≥ 0.
And utility for ιl can bounded be as follows using Inequality A.12 for uιl(∆µˆl)−877
uιl(µ) as Equation A.4 holds :878
uιl(∆µˆl)− uιl(µ)− τιlηl
= uιl(∆µˆl)− uιl(µ) + τηlιl
≥
l−1∑
q=1
∆Uq + uιl(∆µˆl)− uιl(µ) + τj0i0
=
l−2∑
q=1
∆Uˆq + uιl(∆µˆl)− uιl(µ) + uηl(∆µl−1)− uηl(µ) + ui0(∆µ1)− ui0(µ)− τi0j0
≥ l ·Υ
> 0 (A.20)
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The above inequalities entails that ιl, ι
′
l can deviate profitably pairwise; this is a879
violation of pairwise stability and thus cannot be true. Thus there exists no ι′lι
′′
l ∈ µ880
such that ι′l ∈ Nˆl, ι′′l ∈ Nˆl\{ι′l} as well as pι′lι′′l (µ\{ιlηl, ι′lι′′l }) <∞ and τι′lι′′l ≤ 0.881
882
Gains for partners of ιl: only same type partners. Suppose that ∀ι′l ∈ Nˆl : @η′l ∈883
νι′l(µ\ ∪lq=1 {ιqηq}) : xη′l 6= xl. This entails that ∀ι′l ∈ Nˆl : @η′l ∈ νι′l(µ) : xη′l 6= xl884
as kι′l(µ\ ∪lq=1 {ιqηq}) = kι′l(µ). By Lemma 3 it follows there exists ι′l, ι′′l ∈ Nˆl\νi(µ)885
such that pι′lι′′l (µ\{ι′lι′′l }) < ∞, ι′lι′′l ∈ µ and τι′lι′′l ≤ 0 which by the arguments above886
cannot be true. Therefore there has to exist some ι′l ∈ Nˆl for which there is an agent887
η′l ∈ νι′l(µ\ ∪lq=1 {ιqηq}) where it holds that xη′l 6= xl.888
889
Gains for partners of ιl: link is already broken. We shown above that there must890
exist some partner η′q of different type than ι
′
q such that ι
′
qη
′
q ∈ µ. However, there891
can only be a finite number of such links. Therefore, after a number of broken links892
there will be only be duplicate links left, i.e. ι′l, η
′
l ∈ (µ ∩ ∪lq=1{ιqηq}). That is for893
some l′ < l it holds that either ιl, ηl = ιl′ , ηl′ if l − l′ is even or ιl, ηl = ηl′ , ιl′ if l − l′894
is odd.895
If l − l′ is odd, then τι′
l′−1η
′
l′−1
= −τι′l−1η′l−1 and therefore we can reduce the In-896
equality A.16:897
0 ≥
l−1∑
q=l′
[uιq(∆µq)− uιq(µ) + uι′q(∆µq)− uι′q(µ)] + 2τι′l′−1η′l′−1
=
l−2∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq + uι′l−1(∆µl−1)− uι′l−1(µ) + uιl′ (∆µl′)− uιl′ (µ) + 2τι′l′−1η′l′−1
=
l−2∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq + 2 ·
〈
uη′
l′−1
(∆µl′)− uη′
l′−1
(µ) + τι′
l′−1η
′
l′−1
〉
=
l−2∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq + 2 ·
〈
uη′
l′−1
(∆µl′)− uη′
l′−1
(µ) +
l′−1∑
q=1
∆Uq + τι′0η′0
〉
=
l−2∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq + 2 ·
l′−1∑
q=1
∆Uˆq + 2 · [uι1(∆µ1)− uι1(µ)− τι1η1 ]
≥ (l + l′) ·Υ
> 0,
thus there must be a feasible pairwise deviation for some agent pair ιl, ι
′
l where898
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q ∈ [[1, l]].899
If l − l′ is even then τι′l−1η′l−1 = τι′l′−1ηl′−1 ; thus Inequality A.16 for no pairwise900
deviation becomes: 0 ≥∑l−1q=l′ ∆Uq. This can in turn be rewritten as follows:901
0 ≥
l−2∑
q=l′
∆Uˆq + uι′l−1(∆µl−1)− uι′l−1(µ) + uιl′ (∆µl′)− uιl′ (µ)
Using that ιq = η
′
q−1 and η
′
l′−1 = η
′
l−1 we get: 0 ≥
∑l−1
q=l′ ∆Uˆq. Recall that for all902
q ∈ N : q < l it holds that ∆Uˆq ≥ Υ where Υ > 0. Thus there must be a feasible903
pairwise deviation.904
We have now shown that the network µ has perfect sorting.905
906
No link surplus Suppose that µ has link surplus. This would entail that ∃i ∈ N :907
ki(µ) < κ. As nx > κ it must be that ∃i′ ∈ N : xi′ = xi, ii′ /∈ µ. Suppose that908
ki′ < κ then
∑
ι∈{i,i′}[uι(µ∪ {ii′})− uι(µ)] > 0 and thus ii′ can be formed profitably909
pairwise. Moreover, as ki′(µ) = κ it follows that ∃i′′ ∈ νi′ : ii′′ /∈ µ, xi′′ = xi. By910
Lemma 3 it follows there exists ι, ι′ ∈ N˜\νi(µ) such that pιι′(µ\{ιι′}) < ∞, ιι′ ∈ µ911
and τιι′ ≤ 0. This entails that uι(µ)− uι(µ\{ιι′}) + τιι′ ≤ (1− δ)z(x, x). Moreover,912
as
∑
j∈{i,ι}[uj(µ ∪ {iι}\{ιι′})− uj(µ\{ιι′})] ≥ (1− δ) · Z(x, x) it holds that:913 ∑
j∈{i,ι}
[uj(µ ∪ {iι}\{ιι′})− uj(µ)]− τιι′ ≥ (1− δ) · z(x, x)
.914
Thus i, ι can deviate profitably pairwise which contradicts pairwise Nash stabil-915
ity. Therefore it must be that that µ has no link-surplus.916
917
Type connected Suppose that µ is not type connected. As µ we have established918
perfect sorting and no-link surplus there exist i, i′, j, j′ ∈ N : xi = xi′ = xj = xj′ and919
ij, i′j′ ∈ µ and pii′(µ) = ∞. Without loss of generality we assume that τij, τi′j′ ≤ 0920
(otherwise we could simply switch identities some i’s and j’s). This entails:921
min
ι∈{i,i′}
[uι(µ\{ij, i′j′})− uι(µ)] + τij + τi′j′ ≤ 2(1− δ) · z(x, x)
Also we have that:922
min
ι∈{i,i′}
[uι(µ ∪ {ii′}\{ij, i′j′})− uι(µ\{ij, i′j′})] ≥ (κ+ 1) · (1− δ) · z(x, x)
This entails that
∑
ι∈{i,i′}[uι(µ∪ {ii′}\{ij, i′j′})− uι(µ)]− τij − τi′j′ ≥ κ · (1− δ) ·923
Z(x, x); thus i, i′ can deviate profitably. Thus we have established each of the three924
properties are necessary for pairwise stability. 925
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Proof of Theorem 2.926
Inefficiency of sort-connected networks We aim to prove that there exists927
a threshold δopt such that if δ > δopt then there exists a network which has higher928
aggregate utility than any network with sorted connectivity.929
Suppose µ is sort-connected and let µˆ be a bridged, sort-connected network such930
that only two distinct types x, x˜ have links across. Denote two agents of type x931
who link across types as i, i′ and those of type x˜ who link as j, j′. This entails that932
µˆ = µ ∪ {ij, i′j′}\{ii′, jj′}. It follows that the loss in aggregate utility is captured933
by Eq. (A.21). The gain in aggregate utility follows Eq. (A.22). The aggregate934
net-gain in utility is captured by Eq. (A.23).935
U(µ\{ii′, jj′})− U(µ) =− (1− δ)[Z(x, x) + Z(x˜, x˜)] (A.21)
U(µˆ)− U(µ\{ii′, jj′}) =[δ · (nxnx˜ − 2) + 2] · Z(x, x˜) (A.22)
U(µˆ)− U(µ) =− (1− δ)[Z(x, x) + Z(x˜, x˜)− 2Z(x, x˜)] + δnxnx˜ · Z(x, x˜)
(A.23)
The derivative of Eq. (A.23) wrt. δ is Z(x, x)+Z(x˜, x˜)−2Z(x, x˜)+nxnx˜ ·Z(x, x˜)936
Due to supermodularity it holds that Z(x, x) + Z(x˜, x˜) − 2Z(x, x˜) > 0. Therefore,937
U(µˆ)−U(µ) is monotone increasing in δ. Moreover, U(µˆ)−U(µ) = nxnx˜Z(x, x˜) > 0938
when δ = 1 and (µˆ)−U(µ) = −[Z(x, x)+Z(x˜, x˜)−2Z(x, x˜)] < 0 when δ = 0. As both939
aggregate losses and gains are continuous in δ it follows by the intermediate value940
theorem that that there exist a threshold δopt such that if δ > δopt then U(µˆ) > U(µ).941
For any two types we can compute a threshold δoptx,x˜ where gains equal losses as942
below. We use definition of Zˆ from Eq. (7).943
(nx · nx˜) · Z(x, x˜) · δ = 2(1− δ) · (Zˆx,x˜) · Z(x, x˜),
(Zˆx,x˜ +
1
2
nx · nx˜) · δ = Zˆx,x˜,
δ =
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜ +
1
2
nx · nx˜
. (A.24)
For each pair of types we can compare with the threshold for stability δstabx,x˜ from944
Eq. (A.1).945
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δstabx,x˜ >δ
opt
x,x˜(
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜+max(nx,nx˜)−|nx−nx˜|·zˆx,x˜
)
>
Zˆx,x˜
Zˆx,x˜ +
1
2
nx · nx˜
1
2
nx · nx˜ >max(nx, nx˜)− |nx − nx˜| · zˆx,x˜
1
2
nx · nx˜ + |nx − nx˜| · zˆx,x˜ >max(nx, nx˜)
As it holds both that zˆx,x˜ > 0 and that nx·nx˜ > maxnx, nx˜ (because minnx, nx˜ >=946
2) it follows that δoptx,x˜ < δ
stab
x,x˜ . As a consequence it must be that minx 6=x˜ δ
opt
x,x˜ <947
minx 6=x˜ δstabx,x˜ . In other words, this implies that the dominance hold globally for the948
threshold δ¯opt < δstab. As we only evaluated bridged, sort-connected networks where949
two types link across there may exist lower thresholds for optimality δopt ≤ δ¯opt. By950
construction it holds that δopt < δstab.951
Efficiency of networks Our next aim is to show the following properties when952
there are only two types: (i) δopt = δ¯opt; (ii) for δ ≤ δopt it holds that any sort-953
connected network is efficient; and (iii) for δ ≥ δopt any bridged, sort-connected954
network is efficient.955
Property (i). As there are only two types it follows that the only kind of bridged,956
sort-connected network is one where two agents of each of the two types break a957
link and form new links across. The threshold for optimality for this bridged, sort-958
connected can be computed from Eq. (A.24).959
In order to prove properties (ii) and (iii) we want to show there are only two960
classes of networks which can be efficient: the sort-connected and the bridged, sort-961
connected. We begin by noting that utility under hyperbolic decay (from Equation962
3) can be expressed as:963
wij(µ) = (1− δ)1=1(pij(µ)) + δ · 1∈[1,∞)(pij(µ)). (A.25)
Thus total utility from the network has the following form:964
U(µ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
[
(1− δ) · 1=1(pij(µ)) + δ · 1∈[1,∞)(pij(µ))
] · z(xi, xj). (A.26)
The form for aggregate utility in Equation A.26 has the advantage that it is easier965
to perform optimization on. From inspection we see that if a network is connected966
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then indirect term in the weights, δ · 1∈[1,∞)(pij(µ)), is one for all edges, and as a967
consequence the aggregate utility attains its maximal value.968
We first restrict ourselves to look at perfectly sorted networks. If it holds that each969
subnetwork µx ⊆ µ consisting of all links within a given type is connected then the970
argument made above, that the aggregate utility from indirect links (i.e. stemming971
from δ · 1∈[1,∞)(pij(µx)) = 1 for xi = xj, i 6= j in Equation A.26), is maximized972
(conditional on perfect sorting). Finally, it must be that each subnetwork has no973
link surplus. This follows as there exists a subnetwork µ˜x with no link surplus which974
is connected from Lemma 2. Thus any link surplus would imply inefficiency of µx975
as it would hold that the number of links between type x would be lower than976
the possible, i.e.
∑
ij∈µ˜x 1=1(pij(µ˜x)) >
∑
ij∈µx 1=1(pij(µx)), and thus provide lower977
welfare by Equation A.26. As any network with sorted connectivity obtains exactly978
the same utility we know that this set constitutes the set of networks with highest979
aggregate utility among networks with perfect sorting. We know from Proposition 3980
that the set of networks with sorted connectivity is non-empty. We have thus shown981
that the set of networks with sorted connectivity are efficient among perfectly sorted982
networks.983
We proceeed with analyzing efficient networks among those without perfect sort-984
ing. Assume that a network µ is not perfectly sorted. Suppose further that µ is con-985
nected. Then the total utility from indirect links is maximized as 1∈[1,∞)(pij(µ)) = 1986
for every i 6= j. The utility accruing from (direct) links stems from the term987
1=1(pij(µ)) in Equation A.26. Due to supermodularity the utility from (direct) link-988
ing will be maximized if there is perfect sorting, however, this is not feasible as we989
require links across the two types. The minimal required links across types are two990
for every type. This follows as at least one link across types is required and thus the991
number of same type links must be at least one lower. Therefore, the highest attain-992
able number of links within same type is nxκ
2
−1 with two links across. Having nxκ
2
−1993
same type links and two cross-type links as well as type connectivity correspond ex-994
actly to the definition of bridged, sort-connected networks. Any other network which995
is not perfectly sorted can also at most have nxκ
2
−1 same type links. This implies that996
the bridged, sort-connected has maximal benefits possible from direct (links) subject997
to being perfectly sorted. Due to being connected it also has the maximum num-998
ber of indirect benefits. It remains to show that the set of bridged, sort-connected999
networks is non-empty; we can construct a bridged, sort-connected network from a1000
sort-connected network as µˆ = µˆ∪{ij, i′j′}\{ii′, jj′} where xi = xi′ , xj = xj′ , xi 6= xj1001
and µ is sort-connected. We verify the that by construction µˆ the has the feature of1002
being connected (as the subnetworks for each type are connected if we choose each1003
subnetwork using Lemma 2) and there are exactly nxκ
2
− 1 links of same type links1004
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for each type. Thus, we have determined that the bridged, sort-connected network1005
must maximize aggregate utility among networks that are not-perfectly sorted.1006
We have established there are only two networks which can be efficient. We know1007
from Eq. (A.24) that if δ < δopt then the payoff from sort-connected network exceeds1008
the payoff from bridged, sort-connected networks and vice versa. Therefore, when1009
δ ≤ δopt then the sort-connected network is efficient, however, when δ ≥ δopt then1010
the bridged, sort-connected network is efficient. 1011
Proof Proposition 4.. Let µ ∈ Mˆ and δ < δstab. By construction there exists a1012
network µ˜ which has higher aggregate utility. Let the two pairs of agents ii′, jj′ be1013
agents such that µ˜ = µ ∪ {ij, i′j′}\{ii′, jj′} and xi = xi′ = x and xj = xj′ = x.1014
Specify a link-contingent contract to i, j where µˆ = µ ∪ {ij}\{ii′, jj′} such that:1015
∀ιι′ ∈ {ij, i′j′} : Cιι′ + Cι′ι ≥ 12 [Z(x, x) + Z(x˜, x˜)− 2Z(x, x˜)], (A.27)
∀ιι′ /∈ {ij, ji, i′j′, j′i′} : Cιι′ = 0. (A.28)
By Theorem 1 we know that µ is pairwise stable. Pairwise stability implies that1016
1
2
[Z(x, x) + Z(x˜, x˜) − 2Z(x, x˜)] > ui(µ) − ui(µˆ) + uj(µ) − uj(µˆ) as deviation is not1017
profitable. Using this fact together with Inequality A.27 it follows that:1018
Cij + Cji > ui(µ)− bi(µˆ) + uj(µ)− uj(µˆ).
The above inequality entails agents i, j are a blocking coalition that can gain by1019
deviating to µˆ; this blocking move is also the only profitable move for i, j due to1020
pairwise stability of µ and Equation A.28.1021
In network µˆ agents i′, j′ have an incentive to form a link with one another as1022
both have surplus link capacity (i.e. degree below the quota) and forming a link is1023
profitable from Inequality A.27. Moreover, we show in the following that this move1024
is the one that ensures the highest aggregate net benefits to i′, j′.1025
We begin with showing that linking across types to other agents of type x, x˜ is1026
not profitable. Suppose i′ links across types to another agent j′′ ∈ {ι 6= j′ : xι = xj′}.1027
First, note the pairwise deviation from µ to form i′j′′ is unprofitable (due to pairwise1028
stability), thus it less profitable than forming i′j′ from µ (which is profitable by1029
Inequality A.27). Second, the net-increase in value of the pairwise deviation to form1030
i′j′ over i′j′′ increases from µ to µˆ - this is true as j′ loses the link with i from µ while1031
j′′ has an unchanged number - thus j′ will have a weakly lower opportunity cost of1032
deleting links in µˆ. The same argument can be applied to j′ for i′′ ∈ {ι 6= i′ : xι = xi′}.1033
We turn to showing that linking to other agents of same type (staying sorted)1034
is not more profitable as well. Suppose i′ and j′ link to same types as themselves1035
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respectively, i.e. i′′ ∈ {ι 6= i′ : xι = xi′} and j′′ ∈ {ι 6= j′ : xι = xj′}. Suppose ii′′ ∈ µ1036
then no feasible pairwise moves to same type can exist in µˆ as the move can only1037
involve deleting links; same is true if jj′′ ∈ µ. Thus instead we use ii′′, jj′′ /∈ µ. It1038
must be that any pairwise deviation forming either ii′′ or jj′′ from µ is unprofitable1039
(as µ is pairwise stable); this implies that for any ι ∈ νi′′(µˆ) and ι′ ∈ νj′′(µˆ) it holds1040
that:1041
ui′(µˆ ∪ {i′i′′}\{i′′ι})− ui′(µˆ) + ui′′(µˆ ∪ {i′i′′}\{i′′ι})− ui′′(µˆ)− τi′′ι ≤ z(x, x),A.29)
uj′(µˆ ∪ {j′j′′}\{j′′ι′})− uj′(µˆ) + uj′′(µˆ ∪ {j′j′′}\{j′′ι′})− uj′′(µˆ)− τj′′ι′ ≤ z(x˜, x˜).A.30)
As ui′(µ˜)− ui′(µˆ) + uj′(µ˜)− uj′(µˆ) = z(x, x˜) + z(x˜, x) it follows that1042
ui′(µ˜)− ui′(µˆ) + uj′(µ˜)− uj′(µˆ) + Ci′j′ + Cj′i′ > z(x, x) + z(x˜, x˜).
The above inequality implies together with Inequalities A.29 and A.30 that the1043
total gains for i′ and j′ exceeds the total value that could be generated from alter-1044
native deviations. Thus there are two pairwise moves from µ to µˆ and from µˆ to µ˜1045
which both provide strictly higher utility to the deviating agents.1046
Pairwise stability follows from three arguments. First, all deviations among1047
agents where only links in µ˜ ∩ µ are deleted will provide at most the same value1048
in µ˜ that the deviations did in µ - this follows as these agents all have the same links1049
and in µ˜ all agents are connected in µ˜ and thus only direct links matter. This upper1050
limit too gains from deviations implies none of these moves can be profitable as they1051
were unprofitable form µ. Second, deviations that involve deletion of links in µ˜\µ1052
are shown above to provide strictly higher value than any other deviations - thus1053
deviating from µ˜ must also provide strictly lower value. 1054
Proof of Proposition 5.. Under asymptotic independence it follows that average per1055
agent utility for type x under asymptotic perfect sorting converges to (using a geo-1056
metric series):1057
(κ− 1) δ
1− (κ− 1) δ z(x, x)
Let ωxx˜ = κ · E[δpij |xi = x, xj = x˜]. Suppose that for two types, x, x˜ there is not1058
perfect sorting, and in particular there is some mixing between them, i.e. ωxx˜ > 0;1059
the average per agent utility is:1060 [
(κ− 1) δ
1− (κ− 1) δ − ωx
]
· z(x, x) + ωx · z(x, x˜).
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Each agent will almost surely have κ links as it is assumed that each link adds1061
positive value and there are asymptotic infinite agents (only a finite number can then1062
not fulfill the degree quota).1063
As we have a finite set of types we can assume then for large populations there1064
is a subset of types, Xˆ ⊆ X, where for every type x ∈ Xˆ it holds that there is an1065
asymptotic strictly positive share of the total number of agents of that type, i.e.,1066
limn→∞(|{i ∈ Nn}xi=x|/n) > 0. If there is only one such type, i.e. |Xˆ| = 1, then1067
asymptotic perfect sorting follows by assumption as the asymptotic number of links1068
is κ.1069
For any two types x, x˜ ∈ Xˆ which are mixing their average utility is:1070
(κ− 1) δ
1− (κ− 1) δ
[
nx · z(x, x) + nx˜ · z(x˜, x˜)
nx + nx˜
]
− 1
2
·
[
nx · ωxx˜
nx + nx˜
]
· [Z(x, x) + Z(x˜, x˜)− 2Z(x, x˜)].
As there is supermodularity it follows that Z(x, x) + Z(x˜, x˜)− 2Z(x, x˜) > 0 and1071
thus mixing must decrease utility. The same argument can be applied by mixing1072
between multiple types. 1073
Appendix B. Supplementary appendix: finite poulation and constant de-1074
cay in spillovers1075
This appendix extends the analysis of sorted networks with finite number of1076
agents to a setting where decay is constant. We prove properties of stability and ef-1077
ficiency for a sub-class of sort-connected networks under constant decay. Specifically1078
we show that certain network with sorted connectivity are pairwise stable for low to1079
moderate spillovers. We also show that these network are suboptimal for moderate1080
to high spillovers.1081
The appendix is split into two sub-appendices, Appendix B.1 which contains the1082
main results and Appendix B.2 which only contains auxiliary results.1083
Appendix B.1. Suboptimal sorting in local trees1084
We begin by describing the sub-class of sort-connected networks. Informally put,1085
the sub-class has the added requirement that networks are not only connected within1086
each type, but also resembles a certain tree structure. We define a tree as a network1087
where every pair of agents are connected by a unique path. The structure of each1088
subnetwork is such that from the perspective of every agent (i.e. the ego-network)1089
each subnetwork appears as a tree locally. That is, the network becomes a tree if1090
we remove all links for the agents furthest away from the considered agent which are1091
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not on their shortest path(s) to the considered agent. Therefore the networks have1092
a local tree structure but not a global one.1093
The formal definition of local trees is described below. The definition employs1094
the network diameter which is the maximum distance between any two agents, i.e.1095
m(µ) = supi,j∈N pij(µ).1096
Definition 11. A network µ is a local tree when each agent i has κ links where:1097
• for each other agent j 6= i at distance pij(µ) ≤ mn,κ − 2 there are κ − 1 links1098
between agent j and j′ such that j′ is one step further away, i.e. pij(µ) =1099
pij′(µ)− 1;1100
• the network diameter m(µ) = mn,κ,1101
mn,κ = arg min
m
{m : Σml=1(κ(κ− 1)l−1) + 1 ≥ n}. (B.1)
The structure of local trees entails that each agent has κ · (κ − 1)p−1 agents at1102
distance p < m, where m = mn,κ. At distance p = m there are n−
∑m−1
l=1 κ ·(κ−1)l−11103
(all remaining agents). This structure implies that every agent’s utility is maximized1104
subject to the constraint of all agents having at most κ links;20 a side effect is that1105
utility before transfers is symmetric.1106
A necessary condition for local trees to exist is that there is no link surplus, i.e.1107
degree quota is binding (∀i ∈ N : ki = κ). Note this binding condition is only1108
possible when n · κ is even.1109
When a local tree network fulfills n =
∑m
l=1 κ · (κ− 1)l−1 then it is an exact local1110
tree. See the next sub-appendix for an elaborate treatment of structure of exactly1111
local trees. Two subclasses of exact local trees which are worth mentioning. The1112
first is a network known as a cycle or a ring. The cycle is characterized by having1113
a minimal possible degree quota (κ = 2) among local trees and a maximal diameter1114
(m =
⌈
n−1
2
⌉
). The second is a clique where all agents are linked, i.e. the complete1115
network. Cliques have maximal degree quotas (κ = n − 1) and minimal diameters1116
(m = 1). Both subclasses has a network which exists for any n. Note that in Example1117
1 each of the two components is both a cycle and a clique. Note that there exist1118
non-trivial networks beyond the cycle and the clique.211119
20The maximization of utility follows from the observation that each agent has at most κ links,
so at distance p there can be at most κ · (κ− 1)p−1 agents.
21An example is {i1i2, i1i3, i1i4, i2i5, i2i6, i3i7, i3i8, i4i9, i4i10, i5i7, i5i9, i6i8, i6i10, i7i9, i8i10} when
n = 10, κ = 3 and N = {i1, i2, .., i10}.
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In order to derive our results it is necessary to restrict ourselves to a subset of1120
local trees. The subset are those local trees where the deletion of links leads to equal1121
losses to both of agents whose link is deleted; thus we refer to these local trees as1122
having symmetric losses:1123
Definition 12. A local tree µ has symmetric losses when at every distance p =1124
1, ..,m it holds that |{i ∈ N : pιi(µ\{ιι′}) = p}| = |{i ∈ N : pι′i(µ\{ιι′}) = p}|.1125
Whether or not symmetric losses is a generic property for all local trees is an open1126
question. However, in simulations that we perform it holds all network configurations1127
which are local trees up to size n = 10 have symmetric losses (see result below and1128
proof for exhibition of examples). In addition, for size up to n = 16 it has been1129
shown to hold for any networks examined in the simulation.1130
A generalization of stable but suboptimal sorting under constant decay is ex-1131
pressed below. While allowing for constant decay rather than hyperbolic it the set1132
of networks are further restricted.1133
Theorem 3. Suppose there is supermodularity, a degree quota κ and each type has1134
equal number of agents. It follows that any network which is sort-connected and1135
consist of symmetric local trees is also: (i) pairwise stable if δ < δstab; and, (ii)1136
inefficient if δ > δopt. The thresholds satisfy δopt, δstab ∈ (0, 1) where δopt < δstab1137
Proof. We show properties (i) and (ii) together. Let µ be a network which is perfectly1138
sorted into |X| components, one for each type. Each component is a local tree with1139
n/|X| agents. Let there be no transfers between any agents.1140
As each subnetwork for a given type is a local tree it is stable against deviations by1141
agents of the same type - this follows as local trees provides maximal possible benefits1142
among feasible structures of the subnetwork for all agents in the subnetwork. Thus1143
only two agents of different types may have a profitable deviation which is feasible.1144
Let ι, j be agents of respectively types x and x˜. These two agents can deviate by1145
each deleting a link to ι′ and j′ respectively while jointly forming a link. The new1146
network resulting from deletion is denoted µˆ = µ\{ιι′, jj′}. The move resulting from1147
deletion and forming a link is denoted µ˘ = µˆ ∪ {ιj}. An alternative network is µ˜,1148
the type-bridged network of µ, where the links ιι′, jj′ are removed while the links1149
ιj, ι′, j′ have been formed; thus µ˜ = µˆ ∪ {ιj, ι′j′}.1150
Define the gross loss of benefits for i as ui(µˆ) − ui(µ) while the gross gains are1151
ui(µ˜)−ui(µˆ). There must exist a threshold of externalities δstab ∈ (0, 1) where µ is no1152
longer pairwise stable as cost of deviation monotonically decreases and approaches1153
zero as δ → 1 while gains are monotonically increasing. The monotonicity of losses is1154
a consequence of the fact that gross loss consists of shortest paths from µ, where ιι′ is1155
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included in the shortest path, which have longer length in µˆ and thus are discounted1156
more. Therefore the gross loss is mitigated by a higher δ as the longer shortest paths1157
are punished less. The monotonicity of gains follows as the gains consist of new1158
shortest paths to agents of type x˜ through ιj and j′ι′ the value of these increases for1159
higher δ.1160
Exploiting the that Fact 1 and 2 from Appendix Appendix B.2 hold for local1161
trees it follows that for any other agent i of type x (i.e. i is in N\{ι, ι′} and xi = x):1162
ui(µ˜)− ui(µ) > δmin(piι(µ˜),piι′ (µ˜))[uι(µ˘)− uι(µ)].
Aggregating for all agents this implies:1163
U(µ˜)− U(µ) > [uι(µ˘)− uι(µ)] ·
∑
xi=x
δmin(piι(µ˜),piι′ (µ˜)) + [uj(µ˘)− uj(µ)] ·
∑
x′i=x˜
δmin(pij(µ),pij′ (µ)).
where m = mn,κ. The inequality above implies the following: if U(µ˜)−U(µ) = 01164
then uι(µ˘) − uι(µ) + uj(µ˘) − uj(µ) < 0; U(µ˜) − U(µ) > 0 when uι(µ˘) − uι(µ) +1165
uj(µ˘) − uj(µ) = 0. It can also be argued that there must exist a threshold, δopt,1166
such that when δ = δopt then U(µ˜)− U(µ) = 0 and that δopt < δstab. This follows as1167
U(µ˜)−U(µ) < 0 for δ = 0 and U(µ˜)−U(µ) > 0 when uι(µ˜)−uι(µ)+uj(µ˜)−uj(µ) = 01168
as well as continuity of U(µ˜)− U(µ) in δ.1169
This entails that for δ > δopt then µ˜ provide higher aggregate payoff. Moreover1170
we showed previously that for δ < δstab then µ is pairwise (Nash) stable. Thus we1171
have proven properties (i) and (ii).1172
1173
For constant decay the thresholds governing when sorting is respectively subop-1174
timal and stable, i.e. δopt, δstab, can be determined explicitly by solving polynomial1175
equations for every deviation. Moreover, for exact local trees there is a unique solu-1176
tion. In Figure B.3 the two thresholds from Theorem 3, δopt(Zˆ), δstab(Zˆ).1177
The plots in Figure B.3 are made for variations of exact local trees. The upper1178
plots corresponds to cliques with various sizes. The lower plot have fixed degree quota1179
(κ=100) and the threshold is simulated using pattern in utility that is demonstrated1180
in Appendix Appendix B.2. The plots show the scope for inefficiency, i.e. the1181
gap between δopt(Zˆ), δstab(Zˆ), increases with the number of agents involved. This1182
makes sense intuitively as the two agents forming the link will fail to account for an1183
increasing number of indirect connections between the two groups. As the number of1184
indirect connections increases at with the squared with total number of agents then1185
larger populations will lead to larger gaps of inefficiency.1186
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Figure B.3: Visualization of thresholds for connecting from Theorem 3.
The upper diagrams correspond to cliques and the lower ones to exact local trees (where thresholds
stem from Equations B.4, B.5, B.10, B.11).
Appendix B.2. Local trees1187
This sub-appendix provides auxiliary results for deriving the generalization of1188
suboptimal sorting. We begin our focus on exact local trees and subsequently more1189
generally in local tree networks, see Definition 11 in the previous sub-appendix.1190
We will examine a generic network µ which is perfectly sorted and assume that1191
the subset of links for each type is a component that can be classified as either a local1192
tree or an exact local tree. Let networks µx and µx˜ be the components associated1193
with respectively types x, x˜ ∈ X. We will focus on three particular moves:1194
• Pairwise deletion of a link : Suppose two links ιι′, jj′ ∈ µ are deleted and agents1195
ι and j have respectively type x and x˜; thus the two links are not from the1196
same component. Let the new network that results from removal of the links1197
be denoted µˆ = µ\{ιι′, jj′}.1198
• Pairwise formation of a link across types : This move presumes that both agents1199
are also deleting a link. We denote this as a move where agents ι and j form1200
a link: µ˘ = µˆ ∪ {ιj}.1201
• Double pairwise formation of a link across types : When two links are formed1202
across types in µ this corresponds to a non-pairwise deviation as it requires1203
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four coalition members. We denote this as a move where both agents ι and j1204
as well as ι′ and j′ form a link: µ˜ = µˆ ∪ {ιj, ι′j′}.1205
Finally let i denote a generic agent of type x. Let the shortest path in µ from1206
i to either ι or ι′ be denoted pˆi where pˆi = min(piι(µˆ), piι′(µˆ)). When pˆi = 0 then1207
either i = ι or i = ι′.1208
Basic properties. We exploit that µ is a local tree (see Definition 11). Throughout1209
the remainder of the paper let m = mn,κ (see Equation B.1). We express each agent’s1210
number of paths of length p as a function of the number of agents and the degree1211
quota:1212
#pi (µ) = κ(κ−1)p−1−1=m(p)·∆#(n, κ), ∆#(n, κ) =
m∑
l=1
(κ·(κ−1)l−1)−n, (B.2)
where 1=m(p) is the Dirac measure of whether p = m. Using the local tree1213
structure we can express utility without transfers of each agent:1214
ui(µ) =
m∑
l=1
#li(µ) · δl · z(x, x).
Exact local trees1215
Recall exact local trees are local trees where ∆#(n, κ) = 0. We will argue that1216
this entails that exact local trees have the essential property that for every pair of1217
agents there is a unique shortest path of at most length m and the number of paths1218
for every agent is prescribed by Equation B.2. This can be deducted as follows.1219
Note first that the fact that the number of walks with at most length m starting1220
in a given agent i cannot exceed
∑m
p=1 #
p
i (·). Recall also that local trees has the1221
property that all agents are reached within distance m. Moreover exact local trees1222
has the property that for any agent i it holds that n− 1 = ∑mp=1 #pi (µ); thus every1223
shortest path with distances less than or equal to m must be a unique path between1224
the two particular agents.1225
The uniqueness and countability of paths can be used to infer the losses when1226
links are either removed or added to an exact local tree.1227
Exact local trees - loss from deletion. In order to examine the impact of deletion of1228
a link it is sufficient to analyze what happens to one component of types. This is1229
sufficient as other components as the conclusions are valid for all.1230
The deletion of link ιι′ implies that any pair of agents i, i′ whose (unique) shortest1231
path in µ includes the link ιι′ will have a new shortest routing path. For exact local1232
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trees we can exactly determine the length of the new path. Let i be the agent1233
whose distance to ι is least and let i′ be the agent whose distance to ι′ is least, i.e.1234
piι(µ) < piι′(µ) and pi′ι′(µ) < pi′ι(µ).1235
First when link ιι′ is deleted we can show there is no shortest path between i and1236
i′ in µˆ with length below 2m − pˆi − pˆi′ ; that is there is no ii′ whose shortest path1237
in µ includes ιι′ such that pii′(µˆ) < 2m− pˆi − pˆi′ . Suppose this was not true. Then1238
there would exist an agent j who (1) is on the new shortest path between i and i′1239
in µˆ and (2) whose shortest path to agents ι and ι′ does not include the link ιι′ and1240
(3) such that1241
pji(µˆ) + pji′(µˆ) < 2m− pˆi − pˆi′ ,
pji(µˆ) + pji′(µˆ) < 2m−min(piι(µ), piι′(µ))−min(pi′ι(µ), pi′ι′(µ)).
As by construction piι(µ) < piι′(µ) and pi′ι′(µ) < pi′ι(µ) then the expression above1242
is equivalent to: pji(µˆ)+pji′(µˆ) < 2m−piι(µ)−pi′ι′(µ). As the shortest path between1243
i and ι as well as between i′ and ι′ are unchanged from µ to µˆ it follows that we can1244
further rewrite into:1245
pji(µˆ) + pji′(µˆ) < 2m− piι(µˆ)− pi′ι′(µˆ)
However, the above statement implies that in network µ that either ι or ι′ has1246
two paths with lengths of at most m but this violates the definition of exact local1247
trees.1248
We can now show that when link ιι′ is deleted the new shortest path between i1249
and i′ in µˆ has a length of exactly 2m− pˆi− pˆi′ . This is shown by demonstrating there1250
is an agent j such that pji(µˆ) = m − pˆi and pji′(µˆ) = m − pˆi′ . This can be shown1251
follows. Suppose that pji(µˆ) = m− pˆi. We will demonstrate that pji′(µˆ) = m− pˆi′ .1252
As pji(µˆ) = m − pˆi it follows that pjι(µˆ) = m. From the definition of exact local1253
trees there must exist a path of length less than m between j and ι′ in network µ.1254
As argued in the paragraph above neither of these paths can be strictly shorter than1255
m and consequently they must both be exactly m.1256
The number of shortest paths of length p which become altered for agent i is1257
(κ − 1)p−pˆi−1 for p = pˆi, ..,m − 2,m − 1. This can be demonstrated as follows. If1258
agent piι(µ) = m and piι′(µ) = m then no shortest paths are altered; this is clear as1259
agent i as none of the unique shortest paths includes ιι′ as they have at most length1260
m. If instead piι(µ) = m− 1 then the unique shortest path from i to ι′ includes ιι′ is1261
the last link; this implies a new shortest path if ιι′ is deleted. Thus if piι(µ) = m− 11262
then one shortest path of length m is lost. When piι(µ) = m − 2 then one path of1263
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length m− 1 is lost by the same argument; moreover κ− 1 paths that has ιι′ as the1264
second last link. By induction this can be done at higher order and thus for shorter1265
distances. Using the number of rerouted paths shown above we can establish the1266
total number of shortest paths in network µˆ for agent i that has a length of p:1267
#pi (µˆ) =
{
κ(κ− 1)p−1 − 1>pˆi(p) · (κ− 1)p−pˆi−1, p ≤ m
(κ− 1)2m−pˆi−p, p ∈ (m, 2m− pˆi].
(B.3)
By combining the count of shortest paths rerouted with their new length we can1268
generalize the loss for any agent from the deletion of link ιι′ when all agents are1269
homogeneous of type x:1270
ui(µ)− ui(µˆ) =
m−pˆi∑
l=1
[
(κ− 1)l−1 · (δl−1+pˆi − δ2m−(l−1)−pˆi)] · z(x, x). (B.4)
We can aggregate the losses across homogeneous agents of type x and we arrive1271
at the following expression:1272
U(µ)− U(µˆ) =
m∑
l=1
[
2l · (κ− 1)l−1 · (δl−1 − δ2m−(l−1))] · z(x, x). (B.5)
Exact local trees - gains from linking across types. We move on to establishing the1273
gains of establishing a link in a perfectly sorted network where each component is1274
an exact local tree.1275
The gains to agents ι and j of forming a link ιj are direct benefits and the new1276
indirect connections that are accessed through the link ιj. For agent ι the benefits1277
from forming a link with j can be computed with Equation B.3 where the input length1278
is added one (as ιj is added to the shortest path). Recall µ˘ = µ ∪ {ιj}\{ιι′, jj′}.1279
uι(µ˘)− uι(µ) =
[
m∑
l=0
(κ− 1)l · δl +
m−1∑
l=0
(κ− 1)l · δ2m−l
]
· z(x, x˜). (B.6)
The above expression is relevant for evaluating the pairwise gains as it captures1280
individual benefits for a pairwise formation of a link by ι and j. However, we are also1281
interested in the sub-connected network as it allows to assess the efficiency. Suppose1282
instead now that ι′ and j′ also form a link; thus ιj, ι′j′ are formed while ιι′, jj′ are1283
deleted. Let µ˜ = µ ∪ {ιj, ι′j′}\{ιι′, jj′}.1284
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Let i be an agent of type x and let pˆi still denote the least distance to either ι or1285
ι′. We can calculate the benefits for i when ιj, ι′j′ are formed. The benefits are the1286
indirect connections to agents of type x˜ with whom agent i has no connections in µ.1287
The aim is to count the number of paths of a given length.1288
For a given agent i′ of the other type x˜ it must hold that the shortest path in µ˜1289
between i, i′ either contains the link ιj or the link ι′j′, and thus the distance can be1290
computed as follows:1291
pii′(µ˜) = min[pij(µ˜) + pi′j(µ˜), pij′(µ˜) + pi′j′(µ˜)] (B.7)
We further restrict the above expression. We can use that i and i′ of type x˜1292
can be at most 2m + 1 away from each other. This follows from the fact that1293
piι(µ˜) + piι′(µ˜) = 2m and pi′j(µ˜) + pi′j′(µ˜) = 2m. As piι(µ˜) + piι′(µ˜) = 2m and1294
ιj, ι′j′ ∈ µ˜ then it must be that pij + pij′ = 2m + 2. These facts together entail we1295
can rewrite Equation B.7:1296
pii′(µ˜) = min[pij(µ˜) + pi′j(µ˜), pij′(µ˜) + pi′j′(µ˜)]
= min[pij(µ˜) + pi′j(µ˜), 4m+ 2− pij(µ˜)− pi′j(µ˜)]. (B.8)
From the above expression it follows that pii′ ≤ 2m + 1 as the expression is1297
maximized for pij + pi′j = 2m+ 1.1298
The number of shortest paths from i through ιj to agents of the other type x˜ can1299
be found using Equation B.3 for agent ι adding extra distance 1 + pˆi:
22
1300
• for distance p ∈ {1 + pˆi, ...,m+ 1 + pˆi} there are (κ− 1)p−1−pˆi agents;1301
• for distance p ∈ {m+ 2 + pˆi, ..., 2m+ 1} there are (κ− 1)2m+1−(p−1−pˆi).1302
The shortest paths from i not routed through ι but instead through ι′ are those1303
where p+ 1 + pˆi > 2m+ 1; from Equation B.8 we know the new shortest path length1304
is 4m+ 2− p− 1− pˆi. The number of shortest paths through ι′ in network µ˜ will be1305
(κ − 1)2m+1−(p−1−pˆi) and the new length 4m + 2 − p − 1 − pˆi. These facts together1306
imply:1307
#pi (µ˜)−#pi (µˆ) =

(κ− 1)p−1−pˆi , p ∈ {pˆi + 1, ..,m+ 1 + pˆi},
(κ− 1)2m+1−p−pˆi , p ∈ {m+ pˆi + 2, .., 2m+ 1},
(κ− 1)p+pˆi−2m−1, p ∈ {2m+ 1− pˆi, .., 2m}.
(B.9)
22Shortest paths from i must contain both ιj and every link in the shortest path from i to j.
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From the number of paths above we can derive the change in utility from when1308
ιj, ι′j′ are added to the network for a given agent i of type x.1309
ui(µ˜)− ui(µˆ) =

∑m
l=0(κ− 1)l · δl+pˆi
+
∑m−1
l=pˆi
(κ− 1)l · δ2m−l+pˆi
+
∑pˆi−1
l=0 (κ− 1)l · δ2m+l−pˆi
 · z(x, x˜). (B.10)
By aggregating over all agents of type the gain in benefits by forming ιj, ι′j′ is as1310
follows:1311
U(µ˜)−U(µˆ) =
m∑
p=0
[ 1<m(p) · 2 · (κ− 1)p+
1=m(p) · (n− 2 ·
∑m−1
l=1 (κ− 1)l)
]
·

∑m
l=0(κ− 1)l · δl+p
+
∑m−1
l=p (κ− 1)l · δ2m−l+p
+
∑p−1
l=0 (κ− 1)l · δ2m+l−p
·Z(x, x˜).
(B.11)
Local trees1312
We can use the analysis above on exact local trees to bound the gains and1313
losses for (non-exact) local trees. Recall that exact local trees has the property1314
that ∆#(n, κ) = 0 and for non-exact local trees ∆#(n, κ) > 0. Thus the difference1315
between exact and non-exact local trees is that for a given agent the number of1316
connected other agents at exactly distance m is lower for non-exact local trees.1317
Using the analysis of exact local trees we can compute the bounds on loss of1318
utility for a given agent in the local when a link is deleted - this is done by reusing1319
Equation B.3 as follows.1320
We can discount the number of agents initially at distance m by ∆#(n, κ). More-1321
over, the new distance between agents i and i′ after deletion of the link ιι′ is at least1322
min(pii′ , 2m−2− pˆi− pˆi′) at most 2m− pˆi− pˆi′ .23 From these two facts we can derive1323
the bound in loss of utility when ιι′ is deleted. The upper bound of loss (in terms of1324
magnitude) is found when new shortest paths have most distance, i.e. 2m− pˆi− pˆi′ ;1325
the lower bound is found when new distance is least, i.e. min(pii′ , 2m− 2− pˆi− pˆi′):1326
23The upper bound follows from the fact that for any two agents i and i′ in the local tree there
is still always an agent j at distances pij = m − pˆi and pi′j = m − pˆi′ . The lower bound can
be established by repeating an argument used for exact local trees. If the new distance between
two agents i and i′ after deletion of ιι′ had been less than min(pii′(µ), 2m− 2− pˆi − pˆi′) then the
following would be true. There would be multiple shortest paths of length less than or equal to
m− 1 between either (ι and j) or (ι′ and j). This would violate the property of local trees that all
shortest paths of length ≤ m− 1 are unique.
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ui(µ)− ui(µˆ) ≤
m−pˆi∑
l=1
[
max(0, (κ− 1)l−1 − 1=m(l) ·∆#(n, κ))
(
δl−1+pˆi − δ2m−(l−1)−pˆi
)]
· z(x, x),B.12)
ui(µ)− ui(µˆ) ≥
m˜∑
l=1
[
(κ− 1)l−1 ·
(
δl−1+pˆi − δ2m−(l+1)−pˆi
)]
· z(x, x), m˜ = min(m− 1,m− pˆi).(B.13)
Fact 1. If µ is perfectly sorted and consists of |X| components that each constitute1327
a local tree with n/|X| agents, then for any agent i of type x where pˆi > 0:1328
ui(µˆ)− ui(µ) > δpˆi · [uι(µˆ)− uι(µ)], pˆi = min(piι(µˆ), piι′(µˆ)). (B.14)
Proof. Inequality B.14 can be rewritten into: δpˆi · [uι(µ)−uι(µˆ)]− [ui(µ)−ui(µˆ)] > 0.1329
This inequality is equivalent to the expression below (derived by substituting in1330
Inequality B.13 for agent ι and Inequality B.12 for agent i):1331
δpˆi ·
m−1∑
l=1
[
(κ− 1)l−1 ·
(
δl−1 − δ2m−(l+1)
)]
−
m−pˆi∑
l=1
[
(κ− 1)l−1
(
δl−1+pˆi − δ2m−(l−1)−pˆi
)]
> 0,
m−pˆi∑
l=1
[
(κ− 1)l−1 ·
(
δ2m−(l+1)−pˆi − δ2m−(l+1)+pˆi
)]
+
m−1∑
l=m−pˆi+1
[
(κ− 1)l−1
(
δl−1+pˆi − δ2m−(l−1)−pˆi
)]
> 0.
As it holds that 2m− (l+ 1)− pˆi < 2m− (l+ 1) + pˆi and it holds that l−1 + pˆi <1332
2m− (l− 1)− pˆi (equivalent to l < m+ 1− pˆi) the above inequality is satisfied.1333
We can also derive bounds on the gains from connecting across types for local1334
trees. We will not do this explicitly but instead use Definition 12 on symmetric losses1335
in local trees. This allows to express our next result:1336
Fact 2. For the perfectly sorted network µ which consists of |X| network components1337
which each constitute a local tree of n/|X| agents that has symmetric losses then it1338
holds that for agents i, ι of type x and pˆi > 01339
ui(µ˜)− ui(µˆ) ≥ δpˆi · [uι(µ˘)− uι(µˆ)], pˆi = min(piι(µˆ), piι′(µˆ)). (B.15)
Proof. It holds that uι(µ˜)− uι(µˆ) ≥ uι(µ˘)− uι(µˆ) as µ˜ ⊆ µ˘ (thus all shortest paths1340
in µ˜ cannot have a length that exceeds that in µ˘). Therefore it suffices to show:1341
ui(µ˜)− ui(µˆ) ≥ δpˆi · [uι(µ˜)− uι(µˆ)]. (B.16)
As the local tree has symmetric losses it follows that uι(µ˜)−uι(µˆ) = uι′(µ˜)−uι′(µˆ);1342
this follows from the fact that they both gain an equal number of new shortest paths1343
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through j, j′, this follows as as j, j′ have same number of paths after deletion of jj′1344
due to symmetric losses. This entails that without loss of generality we can assume1345
that piι = pˆi as otherwise we could substitute ι with ι
′ and conduct the analysis1346
again.1347
For ι and some agent i′ of type x˜ it holds that pii′(µ˜) ≤ pιi′(µ˜) + pˆi. This follows1348
as there exists a path between i, ι and ι, i′ with respectively lengths pιi′(µ˜) and pˆi;1349
thus pii′(µ˜) ≤ pιi′(µ˜) + pˆi. This implies the following inequality must hold:1350 ∑
xi′=x˜
δpii′ (µ˜) ≥ δpιi(µ˜) ·
∑
xi′=x˜
δpιi′ (µ˜).
As uι(µ˜)−uι(µˆ) =
∑
xi=x˜
∏pιi′ (µ˜)
l=1 δ
rl ·z(x, x˜) and ui(µ˜)−ui(µˆ) =
∑
xi=x˜
∏pii′ (µ˜)
l=1 δ
rl ·1351
z(x, x˜) it follows that Inequality B.16 holds which proves our fact.1352
1353
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